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INTRODUCTION 
From his early days as a practitioner in the 1960s, Joe Brodley has served 
the field of competition law brilliantly as a scholar, teacher, and mentor.  
Beyond his contributions as a superb analyst, Joe used his formidable skills 
with a great humanity.  There is a note in a bottle quality to being an academic.  
It can take years to tell if anyone took the bottle from the sea, read the note, or 
acted on its contents.  Joe has realized the deep satisfaction of knowing with 
certainty that many embraced and benefitted from his teaching and guidance.  
By participating in this Conference, we are pleased to celebrate him.   
The Conference provides an occasion to reflect upon how the discipline of 
antitrust law has changed in the four decades since Joe began his legal career.  
One striking development is the growing significance of comparative study.  
By the mid-1960s, a handful of nations had adopted antitrust laws.  Today the 
number of competition systems approaches 110.  To those of a certain age, this 
development is most improbable.  For example, who foresaw in 1967, the year 
Joe’s article on oligopoly appeared in the Stanford Law Review,1 the 2009 
formation of the BRIC antitrust network – an endeavor that links the 
competition agencies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China?  In the early stages 
of Joe’s scholarship, none of those countries – least of all China and Russia – 
seemed likely candidates to enact antitrust laws. 
The role of the United States has changed substantially amid the global 
adoption of competition laws.  Years ago, the United States was chiefly an 
exporter of antitrust ideas.  Today the experience of other jurisdictions 
increasingly offers a useful means for assessing the quality of the U.S. system 
and illuminates areas for improvement.2  In this Article we focus upon an area 
in which greater convergence of U.S. policy with the practice of many foreign 
countries is long overdue: the treatment of public policies that suppress 
competition.  Whereas the European Union (“EU”) and numerous other 
jurisdictions have taken strong measures to limit restraints imposed by national 
 
1 See Joseph F. Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts – From 
Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REV. 285, 288-89 (1967). 
2 On the relevance of foreign experience in informing the development of competition 
policy in the United States, see WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AT 
100: INTO OUR 2ND CENTURY 1-9 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/ 
workshops/ftc100/docs/ftc100rpt.pdf; William E. Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy 
Reform in Transition Economies for U.S. Antitrust Policy, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 361, 363 
(2000) [hereinafter Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy Reform]. 
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government authorities and political subdivisions,3 U.S. antitrust policy in 
many ways is more tolerant of public restraints upon business rivalry.  Since 
the early twentieth century, Supreme Court doctrines have evolved to grant 
states and the federal government broad rights to enact laws that restrain 
competition.4  Further, individual groups are largely free to lobby for laws 
designed to erect marketplace barriers, and in many cases to mire their 
competitors in a morass of governmental processes.5 
Currently, advocacy is the primary tool available to both public and private 
enforcers of the U.S. antitrust laws to challenge state-imposed restraints on 
competition.  Because government action (and private conduct to obtain such 
action) is challengeable in only relative narrow circumstances, much of the 
battle takes place in the legislative and regulatory arenas rather than in courts.  
Faced with the prospect of being legislated out of business, trade groups invest 
mightily in lobbying.  Too often there are no trade groups to counter 
anticompetitive legislation, leaving the U.S. federal antitrust agencies (the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”)) to devote modest resources to persuade state, and 
occasionally federal, regulators and legislators to consider competitive effects 
in formulating policy.   
Although the U.S. competition advocacy program has achieved important 
success, it is not enough.  United States enforcers should stand on equal 
footing with their EU and other foreign counterparts in being able to challenge 
state action that threatens competition in the same manner as they can 
challenge private conduct.  This need, moreover, is increasingly urgent given 
the larger role that government now plays in the economy in the wake of the 
financial crisis.6 
To that end, Part I of the Article presents reasons why public restraints upon 
competition should be a stronger concern of U.S. competition policy.  Part II 
reviews the existing array of measures by which the U.S. competition policy 
system can challenge government restraints on rivalry.  Part III then describes 
measures available to competition authorities in other jurisdictions to resist 
encroachments by government policies on the competitive process.  Finally, 
Part IV suggests approaches by which the framework of controls upon 
 
3 Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy Reform, supra note 2, at 400-04 (describing 
measures taken by relatively new competition systems to forestall public restraints upon 
competition); Timothy J. Muris, State Intervention/State Action – A U.S. Perspective, 2004 
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 517, 523 (praising EU policies that limit public restraints upon 
competition). 
4 See infra notes 39-121 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text. 
6 For example, through its efforts to rescue traditional North American automobile 
producers, the U.S. government has become a majority shareholder in General Motors.  Neil 
King, Jr. & Sharon Terlep, GM Collapses into Government’s Arms, WALL ST. J., June 2, 
2009, at A1. 
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anticompetitive government policies could be strengthened in the United 
States.  
I. WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT ANTITRUST SCRUTINY OF STATE 
ACTION? 
Most competition policy specialists have heard Adam Smith’s caution that 
“[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public.”7  They 
are less familiar with the passage that immediately follows Smith’s famous 
admonition in The Wealth of Nations.  “It is impossible indeed to prevent such 
meetings,” Smith wrote, “by any law which either could be executed, or would 
be consistent with liberty and justice.  But though the law cannot hinder people 
of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing 
to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.”8 
In these observations, Smith anticipated the two fronts of the battle that 
competition policy systems would have to wage to be successful.  Competition 
laws would need to subdue efforts by private economic actors and public 
entities to suppress business rivalry.  In the discussion below, we consider why 
a program that does the former without addressing the latter ultimately is 
unavailing. 
A. Recognition of the Threat of State-Imposed Restraints to Competition Is 
Widely Shared in the United States and Abroad 
Policy makers sometimes can justify regulations that restrict competition 
when faced with markets that fail to produce goods or services that consumers 
value.  For example, some markets may be so fraught with informational 
asymmetries between producers and consumers that governmental assurance of 
quality is warranted.  Although regulation in these instances may deprive 
consumers of some of the benefits of competition, it may be warranted when 
the benefits of correcting market failures exceed the opportunity costs of 
displaced competition. 
Regulation, however, also can be used to restrict competition, to transfer 
wealth from consumers to a favored industry, rather than to improve consumer 
welfare.  A large body of commentary recognizes that public intervention cast 
as pro-consumer legislation can serve mainly to transfer wealth from 
consumers to a favored industry.9  Observers from a wide range of perspectives 
have emphasized this phenomenon.  In the 1950s, Walter Adams and Horace 
Gray drew attention to how numerous public policies damaged the competitive 
process and warranted closer attention as part of a comprehensive national 
 
7 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 128 (Modern Library ed. 1937) (1776). 
8 Id. 
9 For an excellent recent review of this commentary, see D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting 
Anticompetitive Government Interventions that Benefit Special Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 119, 120 (2009). 
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competition policy.10  In the same decade, Donald Turner and Carl Kaysen’s 
famous synthesis of competition law and economics observed that “legislative 
exceptions cover significant areas of the nation’s economy” and raised 
questions about “the economic justifications for exceptions to competition 
policy.”11  In the early 1960s, Gabriel Kolko challenged the public interest 
interpretation of federal regulatory measures adopted in the first decades of the 
twentieth century and concluded that major business interests supported these 
measures to hamper rivals and serve their own economic ends.12  In the early 
1970s, a study sponsored by Ralph Nader denounced the anticompetitive 
effects of federal regulatory schemes governing areas such as communications, 
electric power, international trade, public procurement, and transportation.13 
The notion that regulation is produced in a black box to maximize social 
welfare has given way to what has become known as the economic theory of 
regulation (“ETR”).14  The foundation of ETR is that politicians and 
constituents are rational economic actors.  As such, constituents demand 
favorable regulation and politicians use the state’s coercive power to supply it 
in return for political support.  When adopting a policy, regulators weigh 
political support from those who stand to gain against political opposition from 
those who stand to lose.  The interest group most able to translate its demand 
 
10 WALTER ADAMS & HORACE M. GRAY, MONOPOLY IN AMERICA 177 (1955). 
11 CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 189 (1959). 
12 GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF 
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 2 (1963). 
13 RALPH NADER, THE MONOPOLY MAKERS: RALPH NADER’S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON 
REGULATION AND COMPETITION 35, 103, 193, 227, 319 (Mark J. Green ed., 1973). 
14 Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political 
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 373 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory 
of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 212-13 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of 
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 4-18 (1971).  ETR has generated a 
vast amount of empirical literature confirming the theoretical model.  For example, several 
studies have shown a strong statistical relationship between campaign contributions and 
congressional voting.  See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND 
ANTITRUST 330-31 (3d ed. 2000).  However, note that although several empirical studies are 
consistent with ETR, taken as a whole the empirical support for ETR is “mixed.”  Id. at 330; 
Henry W. Chappell, Jr., Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A 
Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 77, 77-80 (1982); Henry W. 
Chappell, Jr., Campaign Contributions and Voting on the Cargo Preference Bill: A 
Comparison of Simultaneous Models, 36 PUB. CHOICE 301, 301 (1981); Joseph P. Kalt & 
Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. 
REV. 279, 280-98 (1984); James B. Kau et al., A General Equilibrium Model of 
Congressional Voting, 97 Q.J. ECON. 271, 271 (1982); James B. Kau & Paul H. Rubin, Self 
Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 365, 365 
(1979); James B. Kau & Paul H. Rubin, Voting on Minimum Wages: A Time-Series 
Analysis, 86 J. POL. ECON. 337, 337-41 (1978); Steven D. Levitt, How Do Senators Vote?  
Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology, 86 
AM. ECON. REV. 425, 438 (1996). 
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for a policy preference into political pressure is the one most likely to achieve 
its desired outcome.  And this interest group is more often than not likely to 
represent industry, rather than consumer, interests.  It has long been recognized 
that because of industry’s superior efficiency in political organization relative 
to consumers, consumer interests are often subservient to industry interests in 
the regulatory process.  Beyond a certain point, per capita benefits from a 
preferred regulatory outcome are diluted such that it becomes irrational to take 
part in the political process.  A practical consequence of this is that small, 
concentrated groups with similar interests – like members of a particular 
industry – can organize political support more effectively than large diffuse 
groups – like consumers generally.  Thus, the equilibrium outcome of the 
political process is likely that regulation protects a favored industry from 
competition at the expense of consumer welfare. 
Politicians seldom present regulation to the public as the political bargain 
that it is.  Instead, favored industries often claim the mantel of “consumer 
protection,” and argue that they need to restrain market forces for the greater 
good.  These sorts of consumer protection concerns are often raised as a sort of 
“trump card” against competition and consumer choice.15  Although some 
groups may sincerely offer consumer protection concerns, because special 
interest groups often raise them as a fig leaf for their own narrow economic 
benefit, they should not necessarily be taken at face value. 
Recognition of the competitive dangers of various forms of public 
intervention has led to the development of a broad international consensus 
among competition agencies about the importance of programs to curb 
anticompetitive public policies.  In 2003, FTC Chairman Timothy Muris laid 
out the rationale for having competition agencies make public restraints a 
central focus of their work: 
Unless arrested and reversed, the expansion of the zone of immunity . . . 
will, by blunting the operation of our antitrust laws in key sectors, 
undermine the beneficial economic integration of the nation.  The terrain 
that antitrust enforcement has gained through decades of strenuous effort 
 
15 Consider the example of unauthorized practice of law (“UPL”) rules that prohibit non-
attorneys from handling routine tasks associated with the closing of a residential real estate 
transaction.  By protecting attorneys from having to compete against non-attorneys, UPL 
restrictions raise the prices for legal services.  Although proponents of these restrictions tout 
their necessity in protecting uninformed consumers, empirical examination shows that these 
restrictions provide consumers with no cognizable benefits in terms of increased protection 
from fraud or incompetence.  But consumers are unlikely to mount a challenge.  First, bar 
associations often promulgate these rules and state supreme courts adopt them through 
processes that only members of the bar – the beneficiaries – are likely have knowledge.  
Second, even if consumers become aware that UPL restrictions are being considered, they 
would have to expend resources to understand that, despite the rhetoric from the bar 
associations, these restrictions are almost certain to harm consumers.  Finally, once aware of 
the costs associated with a proposed UPL restriction, organizing to fight it would be difficult 
given the expense involved and the collective action problems.   
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to establish the illegality of private cartels and other forms of 
demonstrably anticompetitive conduct will be surrendered at great 
economic cost if collusion and exclusion facilitated by government action 
become readily available alternatives.16   
One year later, Ulf Böge, the President of the German Cartel Office and the 
Chair of the Steering Committee of the International Competition Network, 
underscored the growing international acceptance of a norm that treats public 
restraints as being as hazardous to competition and consumer interests as 
private conduct.  Böge recognized: 
Economic policy researchers have increasingly come to realize, however, 
that a large number of these restrictions of competition, if not most, are 
not caused by private companies at all.  It is rather the governments 
themselves which cause damage to consumers and reduce overall 
economic welfare due to distortions and restraints of competition 
resulting from their laws, regulations or concrete administrative 
practice.17 
B. Paradox of Effective Anti-Cartel Enforcement Programs 
The past fifteen years have featured general international acceptance among 
the world’s competition policy systems of a norm that treats schemes among 
direct competitors to set prices, allocate customers, or divide geographic 
territories as extremely serious offenses.18  This consensus is reflected in ever 
more aggressive efforts within many jurisdictions to detect cartels, prosecute 
their members, and punish firms and individuals alike.19  Firms today face 
increasingly formidable civil fines, private treble damages, and criminal 
punishment if they agree among themselves to set the terms on which they will 
do business. 
Successful efforts to address private collusive behavior can inspire firms to 
seek legislative dispensations from antitrust oversight or to pursue regulatory 
measures that place the power of the state behind efforts to forestall entry or 
expansion by rival firms.  For prospective cartel members, public intervention 
that suppresses rivalry has important advantages over purely private collusive 
action.  Public restraints may confer immunity from antitrust prosecution, and 
 
16 Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission and the Future 
Development of U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 385. 
17 Ulf Böge, President, Bundeskartellamt, Speech on the Occasion of the Opening 
Session of the Seoul Competition Forum 2004: State-Imposed Restrictions of Competition 
and Competition Advocacy 2 (Apr. 20, 2004), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/ 
wEnglisch/download/pdf/04Seoul_e.PDF. 
18 Scholars have documented and analyzed this trend in international law.  See generally 
CRIMINALIZATION OF COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU MEMBER STATES (Katalin J. Cseres et al. eds., 2006). 
19 See Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Cartels: Sanctions Against Individuals, 9 J. 
COMPETITION L. & POL’Y 7, 36-46 (2007) (reviewing enforcement trends).  
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such restraints engage the machinery of the state in policing compliance with 
commands that set prices, output levels, or terms of entry.  A competition 
policy that only addresses private restraints will motivate firms to turn away 
from private measures and to invest more effort in obtaining state-imposed 
restrictions.  Without effective means to anticipate, and to discourage 
governments from acquiescing in, demands for public restraints, competition 
law enforcement merely alters the form of collusive activity and does not 
diminish its harmfulness.20   
C. Complexity of the Regulatory Thicket  
Many fields of economic regulation present significant levels of complexity.  
Examples include regimes governing public procurement at the national, state, 
and local levels; controls on land use; and rules determining the manner in 
which pharmaceuticals can be introduced into the market.  Today’s regulatory 
state provides a target rich environment for those willing to invest the effort to 
understand the manners in which a regulatory program can be used to hinder 
competition.  As the Federal Register and other compendia of public 
regulations continue to grow, so do opportunities for incumbents to shield 
themselves from rivalry that would benefit consumers.   
Regulatory complexity has two potentially adverse consequences.  First, the 
sheer mass and intricacy of regulatory controls give an advantage to larger 
incumbent enterprises that have deciphered the regulatory scheme and, 
compared to smaller firms or thinly funded new entrants, have more resources 
to navigate the regulatory process.21  This condition serves to entrench the 
position of significant incumbents, discourage entry, or channel entrepreneurs 
into the informal sector of the economy, which affords business operators 
fewer protections than they would receive by registering their businesses 
through formal incorporation processes.22  
The second disadvantage of complexity is that it leaves regulatory systems 
prone to gaming and manipulation by sophisticated incumbents.  Some firms 
use their knowledge of complex systems to pull specific regulatory levers to 
forestall actual or potential rivals – for example, by filing objections with 
 
20 See Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 165, 170 (2005) (“Protecting competition by focusing solely on private restraints is 
like trying to stop the water flow at a fork in a stream by blocking only one channel.  A 
system that sends private price fixers to jail, but makes government regulation to fix prices 
legal, has not completely addressed the competitive problem.  It has simply dictated the 
form the problem will take.”). 
21 See William E. Kovacic, Regulatory Controls as Barriers to Entry in Government 
Procurement, 25 POL’Y SCI. 29, 34-37 (1992) (discussing how complete regulatory 
requirements can discourage entry into public procurement competitions). 
22 For the leading treatment of how complexity leads firms to operate informally without 
the protection of the law, see HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE 
REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD 12 (1989). 
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regulatory authorities to petitions of newcomers to enter markets.  In one 
sense, firms using this strategy work within the system by means that do not 
violate the law.  They invoke governmental process to delay, or otherwise 
impose costs on a rival to hinder competition.  Certain grocery store chains, for 
example, have found this strategy useful in raising Wal-Mart’s costs of entry 
into many markets.  Incumbent firms have become adroit at invoking 
environmental and zoning regulations that require hearings and lengthy 
studies.  By doing so, such parties have been able to forestall competition from 
Wal-Mart.  These efforts literally cost consumers in these communities 
millions of dollars.23 
Other forms of activity use the regulatory state in ways that involve actual 
deceit or conduct that contradicts the spirit of a regulatory regime.  Such 
strategies have been evident in the prescription drug market.  For example, 
brand name manufactures have found myriad ways in which to block generic 
entry by taking advantage of the complexity of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the 
FDA’s regulatory scheme.  Misrepresenting the nature of patents held on brand 
name drugs in required FDA filings can forestall generic entry for over two 
years.24  Further, brand name and generic drug makers have taken advantage of 
the 180-day exclusivity given to the first generic drug maker to challenge a 
branded drug’s patents by entering into reverse-settlement agreements that 
allow them to share monopoly profits.25 
Competition agencies can provide at least a partial antidote to both 
consequences of complexity.  They can act as advocates for regulatory 
simplification measures that eliminate requirements that discourage entry and 
do not impede the attainment of legitimate regulatory objectives.26  
 
23 See R. Michelle Breyer, Turf Wars: Big-Box Legal Battles Focus on Location, 
Location, Location, HOME CHANNEL NEWS (National Report), May 19, 2003, available at 
2003 WLNR 17143265; Editorial, Public Good: Wal-Mart Shows Government How It’s 
Done, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 3, 2006, available at 
http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20061003/news_lz1ed3bottom.html; Mike 
Mckee, Small-Town Law, Big-Box Trouble: Wal-Mart Challenges Ordinance Banning 
‘Discount Superstores,’ RECORDER (S.F.), Feb. 24, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 
25577184.  
24 See In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363, 380-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE 4-5 
(2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/P013518enfperspectNoerr-
Penningtondoctrine.pdf [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE NOERR-
PENNINGTON DOCTRINE]. 
25 See In re AndroGel Antitrust Litig., No. 1:09-MD-2084-TWT (N.D. Ga. Feb. 22, 
2010); In the Matter of Schering-Plough Corp., et al., 136 F.T.C. 956, 89 (2003), rev’d, 402 
F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 1, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Cephalon, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2008) (No. 08-0244). 
26 Robert D. Anderson & William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy and International 
Trade Liberalisation: Essential Complements to Ensure Good Performance in Public 
Procurement Markets, 18 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 67, 69 (2009). 
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Competition authorities also can use their powers to attack fraud, deception, 
and related forms of conduct that attempt to use the regulatory process to 
restrict entry or expansion by rival firms.27   
D. Increased Role of Government in the Wake of the Financial Crisis 
Since the financial meltdown of 2008, the role of the federal government in 
the economy has increased at a rapid rate.  Major financial institutions 
accepted government TARP money in exchange for an increased government 
role in their operations.  Similarly, two of the “Big Three” automakers 
accepted financial assistance conditioned on greater government involvement 
in the industry.28  When government-owned corporations operate in markets, 
there is always the temptation to alter the playing field in their favor.  For 
example, the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) competes in parcel post 
and expedited delivery markets with FedEx and UPS.  Due to the network it 
has developed as a result of its government-protected monopoly over letter 
carriage and a host of other legal protections it enjoys, however, the USPS’s 
presence distorts competition.29  Further, in an attempt to ameliorate the 
economic effects of the financial crisis, Congress passed the American 
Reinvestment and Recovery Act (“ARRA”) of 2009, which contained stringent 
“buy American” provisions that apply to certain infrastructure projects funded 
by the Act.30  By erecting entry barriers to lower-cost foreign producers, this 
provision of the ARRA has proved a windfall to certain domestic concerned 
parties, who not coincidentally, lobbied for these provisions.31 
The aftermath of the financial crisis has not only directly affected 
government involvement in the economy, but in general has fed impulses to 
rely less on competition, and more on government dictate, to organize the 
 
27 See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of Cal., 140 F.T.C. 123 (2005); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 135 
F.T.C. 444 (2003); Biovail Corp., 134 F.T.C. 407 (2002); William E. Kovacic, Rating the 
Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903, 
911, 913 (2009) (describing FTC cases involving manipulation of government processes). 
28 See David E. Sanger, Jeff Zeleny & Bill Vlasic, G.M. Heads to Bankruptcy Protection 
as U.S. Steps in: Obama Makes a Bet that the Carmaker Can Recover, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 
2009, at A1; Matthew L. Wald, $2 Billion in Grants to Bolster U.S. Manufacturing of Parts 
of Electric Cars, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009, at B5. 
29 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWS THAT APPLY DIFFERENTLY TO THE 
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE AND ITS PRIVATE COMPETITORS 93 (2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/01/080116postal.pdf.  
30 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1605, 123 
Stat. 115, 303 (2009).  Unlike previous buy-American provisions, those in the ARRA 
require one hundred percent American content and apply a hardship exception only if 
purchasing from an American source raises the cost of the entire project, as opposed to the 
specific component, by twenty-five percent.  Id. § 1605(b)(3).  
31 Id.; see also Anthony Faiola & Lori Montgomery, Trade Wars Launched with Ruses, 
End Runs; Outrage in Canada as U.S. Firms Sever Ties to Obey Stimulus Rules, WASH. 
POST, May 15, 2009, at A1.  
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economy.  These conditions have allowed those who would benefit from 
government restrictions on competition to point to the perceived failure of 
financial markets adequately to deal with risk as a justification for limiting 
competition in their industry.  It is not hard to imagine, for example, attorneys 
and real estate brokers pointing to the financial crisis as a justification for 
requiring consumers to hire an attorney to handle residential real estate 
transactions and to restrict the entry of limited-service brokers, respectively. 
These and other measures have powerful direct and indirect effects on 
competition in the affected industries.  Competition agencies have a strong 
stake in seeing that competitive distortions are minimized and that what are 
depicted as temporary expedients do not become enduring elements of public 
policy.  
E. Increased Economic Integration 
Throughout the history of the United States, improvements in 
communications and transportation have facilitated the integration of the 
economies of individual states and have fostered the establishment of a unified 
domestic economic market.  This was the case, for example, in the 
development of rail transport and telegraph communications in the second half 
of the nineteenth century.  It is ever more the case today as e-commerce 
supplies a new means for distant sellers and buyers to transact business.   
These technology-driven trends create a greater degree of interdependence 
among economic actors who previously operated in what might have seemed 
localized markets.  In an earlier era, many regulatory controls imposed by 
states or municipalities mainly affected the jurisdictions that enacted the 
restrictions.  For these types of government intervention, spillovers across state 
borders may have been negligible.  In this context, the political process acted 
as a check on anticompetitive state practices.  A jurisdiction that imposed 
onerous restrictions on its citizens faced the possibility that its citizens, 
realizing their comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis other states, would use the 
political process to replace public officials who adopted the policies and foster 
change in the underlying regulatory controls. 
Today a smaller and smaller amount of commerce is truly “local.”  For 
many products and services, economic integration links firms and customers 
located in different states.  This gives individual states a greater ability than 
they once had to adopt restraints that impose costs on other states and to 
protect the interests of firms within their own borders.  Greater integration 
means that restrictive rules adopted in one state no longer can be assumed to 
generate effects only in that state.  Spillovers are likely to be more common, 
and federalism arguments based on notions of state sovereignty and the local 
nature and effects of economic regulation arguably should be reassessed in 
light of the larger national interest in promoting a common economic union. 
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F. Distributional Issues 
A significant number of state restrictions on competition harm those who are 
at the bottom of the economic pyramid.32  Most jurisdictions limit entry into 
legal and medical professions under the auspices of assuring certain levels of 
quality.  No one seriously disputes the need for some form of professional 
regulation in the presence of large information asymmetries and serious 
spillover effects.  In most cases it is difficult, if not impossible, for a consumer 
to judge the quality of her physician or attorney, and these practitioners are 
unlikely to internalize the full costs of their mistakes.  Some level of state 
credentialing and regulation makes sense.  In other areas, however, the need 
for stringent licensing requirements and regulation seems less obvious.  For 
example, states have restricted entry into providing real estate brokerage and 
closing services,33 hair braiding,34 yoga instruction,35 fluoride treatment,36 and 
teeth whitening37 under the auspices of protecting the public.  A large body of 
empirical work has shown that these barriers are likely to lead to higher prices, 
reduce consumer choice, and provide few if any consumer benefits in terms of 
increased quality.  For those in the higher range of income distributions, the 
higher prices paid to close a real estate transaction or to have their teeth 
whitened may be a minor nuisance.  For the poor, the price increases often 
mean the difference between having access to a service or not.  For example, 
recent FTC enforcement and advocacy efforts have targeted attempts to limit 
the ability of dental hygienists or mobile dentists to deliver routine dental care 
to poor children in South Carolina and Louisiana.38  Fulfillment of these 
 
32 The beneficial distributional effects of competition policy initiatives to curtail state-
imposed limits on competition are discussed in William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy, 
Consumer Protection, and Economic Disadvantage, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 101, 116 
(2007). 
33 See, e.g., Competition in Real Estate Brokerage Services, Remarks at the H.R. 
Subcomm. on Housing & Community Opportunity (2006) (statement of J. Bruce McDonald, 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div.), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/public/testimony/217299.htm (discussing “the competitive implications of developments 
taking place in the real estate brokerage marketplace”).  
34 Mike Devaney, Winners and Losers in the Preference Game, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Oct. 20, 1998, at B7, available at 1998 WLNR 903064 (“Sabrina Reese, who 
owns two African hair-braiding salons in Los Angeles, dropped out of cosmetology school 
because hair braiding wasn’t covered in class or on the licensing exam.  She currently faces 
a one-year jail term for ‘practicing cosmetology without a license.’”); Hair Braiders Won’t 
Need License, DULUTH NEWS TRIB., June 16, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 22918441. 
35 Dan Walters, Professionals and Politics, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, May 17, 1994, at A3, 
available at 1994 WLNR 4729348. 
36 See S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry, 138 F.T.C. 229, 230-31 (2004). 
37 See, e.g., Mall Teeth-Whitening Business Shut Down, WYFF NEWS 4 (Greenville, 
S.C.), Feb. 29, 2008, available at http://www.wyff4.com/news/15446468/detail.html. 
38 FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE FTC IN 2008: A FORCE FOR CONSUMERS AND COMPETITION 
16 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/03/ChairmansReport2008.pdf. 
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regulatory schemes would have reduced the number of students who received 
dental care at all.  
Not only do these barriers make purchasing certain services more expensive, 
but they also eliminate yet another option to earn a living for those who 
already have so few.  Vocations involving health and beauty services, such as 
hair styling, teeth whitening, or exercise instruction require little formal 
training and can provide a relatively quick path for those with entrepreneurial 
DNA to work their way out of conditions of poverty.  Additionally, such 
restrictions on competition have both macro and micro implications.  At the 
macro level, robust competition is associated with higher incomes more 
generally; programs that curb public restraints on competition are likely to 
reduce poverty.  At a more personal, micro level, these restraints not only 
reduce income but also the less quantifiable personal satisfaction that comes 
from being able to engage in the process of earning a living.  
II. THE CURRENT U.S. TOOLKIT 
The U.S. competition policy system provides some means for government 
agencies and private litigants to challenge government restraints on 
competition.  On the whole, these measures supply relatively weak constraints, 
especially when compared to the powers available to a number of foreign 
authorities.  Despite their limitations, the application of these tools has 
provided a useful curb upon some forms of public intervention and upon 
private parties who seek to invoke the protection of the state. 
A. Limits to Enforcement 
In the United States, the Supreme Court has crafted two judicial doctrines 
that greatly hamper the ability of the antitrust laws to deter state-imposed 
competition restraints.  First, out of respect for federalism, restraints imposed 
directly by the state sovereign – a state legislature or a state supreme court, 
acting in a legislative capacity – are protected from antitrust challenge under 
the state action doctrine.39  Further, the state action doctrine may shield actions 
taken by subsidiary government entities and by private parties in some 
circumstances.  Guided by First Amendment concerns, the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine prevents agencies from bringing actions against parties for the 
anticompetitive effects of state action they urge.40   
 
39 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352-53 (1943) (creating the state action doctrine); 
see also Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-68 (1984) (“[W]hen a state legislature adopts 
legislation, its actions constitute those of the State . . . and ipso facto are exempt from the 
operation of the antitrust laws.” (citations omitted)).  The Court also extended this ipso facto 
exemption to a state supreme court acting in a legislative capacity.  Id. at 568.  
40 The doctrine takes its name from the first two cases that the Supreme Court considered 
in this jurisprudential line.  See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 
670 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 
(1961).  For a detailed exposition of some of the issues presented by the Noerr-Pennington 
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1. State Action Doctrine 
Since 1943, through what has come to be known as the “state action 
doctrine,” the Supreme Court has limited the ability of the federal antitrust 
laws to reach into state affairs.  At its core, the state action doctrine allows 
federal courts to examine only the pedigree and the process governing a state 
regulatory regime, not its substantive effect on the economy.41  Thus, 
anticompetitive state regulation is allowed to stand as long as the court is 
satisfied that the restraint in question is truly state action.  States can avail 
themselves of state action immunity to defend Supremacy Clause challenges to 
the constitutionality of anticompetitive regulatory schemes.  Private parties and 
non-sovereign elements of state government entities also can take advantage of 
state action immunity to defend antitrust suits when they are acting under color 
of state law.  Below we discuss in more detail the metes and bounds of this 
complex area of law.   
a. Preemption 
At its core, the state action doctrine is about federalism.  It attempts to 
resolve the extent to which a state, in a system of dual sovereigns, can pursue 
policies that conflict with the national policy in favor of competition.  Under 
Supremacy Clause jurisprudence, a court can invalidate a state law in three 
circumstances: when (1) Congress expressly preempts state law; (2) the 
scheme of federal regulation is such that it is reasonable to infer that Congress 
has “left no room” for states to regulate; or (3) there is a direct conflict 
between state and federal regulatory action so that either “compliance with 
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” or “state law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress.”42  In the case of the interplay between state 
economic regulation and the federal antitrust laws, it is clear that (1) and (2) do 
not apply: there is no express preemption of anticompetitive state regulation in 
federal antitrust laws, and Congress left room for states to regulate 
anticompetitive behavior by explicitly allowing for state enforcement of the 
antitrust laws.43  Thus, any Supremacy clause challenge to a state regulatory 
 
doctrine, see ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE, supra note 
24, at 16-36. 
41 See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670. 
42 Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). 
43 This point highlights how antitrust preemption comes about in a different setting than 
most preemption settings.  Preemption analysis often involves the reconciliation of differing 
federal and state standards that address the same concerns.  For example, there is a robust 
debate as to whether the federal health privacy regime (HIPAA) should trump inconsistent 
state privacy regimes.  See James C. Cooper & Daniel J. Gilman, There Is a Time to Keep 
Silent and a Time to Speak, the Hard Part Is Knowing Which Is Which: Striking the Balance 
Between Privacy Protection and the Flow of Health Care Information, 16 MICH. 
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regime must argue that compliance with the state regime results in an antitrust 
violation or that the regime conflicts with the “full purpose” of the antitrust 
laws. 
When preemption is based on a state-federal conflict argument, 
Congressional intent is necessarily the touchstone of any analysis;44 before a 
court can determine the extent of any conflict, it must be able to discern how 
far Congress intended the law in question to reach into state affairs.  The courts 
have said at various times that the antitrust laws express a national policy in 
favor of competition45 and that Congress acted to the fullest extent of its 
commerce powers when enacting the antitrust laws.46  Thus, at first blush one 
 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. Rev. 279 (2010).  The analog in the antitrust context would be 
whether state antitrust laws can survive when they differ from federal standards.  See 
California v. Atl. Richfield of Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101-02 (1989) (reconciling state and 
federal antitrust laws with respect to state legislation allowing indirect purchasers to have 
antitrust standing and holding that the federal antitrust laws supplement, rather than 
supplant, state antitrust laws).  In the context of state action preemption, the issue is: to what 
extent can a state law promote anticompetitive conduct before it is preempted?  That is, 
unlike the typical preemption case, in the state action context state and federal laws are at 
cross purposes – the federal regime is designed to root out anticompetitive conduct while the 
state regime purposely displaces competition in pursuit of a competing goal.   
44 See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194 (“[W]e ‘start with the assumption that the historic police 
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear 
and manifest purpose of Congress.’” (internal citations omitted)); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 
518 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1996) (“‘[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in 
every pre-emption case . . . .  As a result, any understanding of the scope of a pre-emption 
statute must rest primarily on ‘a fair understanding of congressional purpose.’” (quoting 
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 530, n. 27 (1992))). 
45 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust laws in general, 
and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.  They are as 
important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill 
of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.  And the freedom 
guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete – to 
assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can 
muster.  Implicit in such freedom is the notion that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to 
one sector of the economy because certain private citizens or groups believe that such 
foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more important sector of the 
economy.”); see also Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 
(1978) (“‘The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of 
competition.’” (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951))); Perma Life 
Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (observing that “the law 
encourages [the plaintiff’s] suit to further the overriding public policy in favor of 
competition”); United States v. S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 672 F.2d 469, 481 
(5th Cir. 1982) (“[T]here is the strong policy in favor of competition that underlies the 
federal antitrust laws.”). 
46 See United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945); In re W. Liquid 
Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 202, 204 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Chrysler Corp. Parts 
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may think that anticompetitive state laws would easily fall when pitted against 
the national competition laws.  When the Court first addressed the question 
head on, however, it reached the opposite result.  In Parker v. Brown,47 a case 
involving a preemption challenge to a California regulatory scheme that set up 
a raisin cartel, the Court resolved the question of conflict by finding none.48  It 
interpreted the Sherman Act in light of the federal system of dual sovereignty 
to urge an abundance of caution when attributing to Congress intent to nullify a 
state regulatory regime.49  Within this framework, the Court held that “nothing 
in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history . . . suggests that its 
purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed 
by its legislature.”50  Rather, the Sherman act is directed against “individual 
and not state action.”51  Thus, regardless of anticompetitive impact or intent, 
the antitrust laws cannot strike down state action that supplants competition 
with regulation.  This has remained a bedrock principle in subsequent cases.52   
The Court’s holding in Parker must be seen in historical context.  The Court 
had only recently engaged in a jurisprudential revolution, rebuking decades of 
holdings that struck down state regulatory schemes on the grounds that they 
interfered with economic liberties.53  As others have noted, Parker then can be 
seen as a necessary concession to anticompetitive state regulation to avoid a 
return to the Lochner era.54  Modern antitrust – with its focus on consumer 
welfare – and economic due process look very much the same.  Once the 
federal judiciary got out of the business of second-guessing the wisdom of 
states’ economic regulation under substantive due process analysis, it could 
hardly reopen this line of attack under the guise of antitrust.  Parker prevented 
this outcome.  Consistent with the post-Lochner rejection of economic 
substantive due process, the Supreme Court made clear in Parker that state 
 
Wholesalers, Nw. Region, 180 F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir. 1950) (holding that when enacting 
the Sherman Act, Congress exercised the full extent of its commerce power). 
47 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
48 Id. at 344-45, 351. 
49 Id. at 351.  
50 Id. at 350-51.  
51 Id. at 352. 
52 E.g., Rice v. Norman, 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982); New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. 
Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 110-11 (1978); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 
117, 133 (1978). 
53 See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 243 (1941); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379, 391-92 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-38 (1934).  
54 See Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the 
Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486, 499-501 (1987); William H. Page, Antitrust, 
Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action 
Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1104 (1981); Paul R. Verkuil, 
State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 328, 331 (1975). 
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laws will not be preempted by federal antitrust laws merely because they have 
an anticompetitive effect.55   
Although the Supreme Court has never expressed this concession directly, it 
is telling that in the two antitrust preemption cases that also included due 
process challenges, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,56 and New Motor 
Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,57 the Court mustered similar 
arguments to deal with both claims.  For example, in Exxon, the Court quickly 
rejected the substantive due process objection to Maryland’s scheme, 
explaining that although the evidence may cast doubt on the law’s wisdom, 
“the Due Process Clause does not empower the judiciary to sit as a 
superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation.”58  It concluded that 
“[r]egardless of the ultimate economic efficiency of the statue, we have no 
hesitancy in concluding that it bears a reasonable relation to the State’s 
legitimate purpose in controlling the gasoline retail market.”59  Turning to the 
antitrust preemption challenge, the Court held that the mere fact that the 
Maryland divorcement regulation is likely to be anticompetitive, and thus “in 
this sense, there is a conflict between the statute and the central policy of the 
Sherman Act,” is an insufficient reason to strike it down, “[f]or if an adverse 
effect on competition were, in and of itself, enough to render a state statute 
invalid, the States’ power to engage in economic regulation would be 
effectively destroyed.”60  Similarly, in Orrin W. Fox, the Court addressed a due 
process challenge by pointing to states’ broad power to engage in economic 
 
55 Parker, 317 U.S. at 351-52.  Merrick Garland, currently a member of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, has argued that because the Supreme Court 
rejected “the Lochner-era doctrine of substantive due process, under which federal courts 
struck down economic regulations they viewed as unreasonably interfering with the liberty 
of contract,” it could not “resurrect Lochner in the garb of the Sherman Act.”  Garland, 
supra note 54, at 499-500; see also Mass. Food Ass’n v. Mass. Alcoholic Beverages Control 
Comm’n, 197 F.3d 560, 565 (1st Cir. 1999) (“To allow federal judges to decide which of 
these legislative enactments should survive and which should be condemned comes close to 
reintroducing the kind of judgments that got the Supreme Court into so much trouble in the 
Lochner era.”).  Further, when there is a pre-legislative history of state regulation in a field, 
there is a presumption against finding congressional intent to preempt.  This presumption is 
relevant in the state action area, because, as the Court’s post-Lochner cases make 
painstakingly clear, the states have a long history of exercising their police powers to 
restrain competition for the sake of public health and safety.  See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 525-
30 (collecting cases). 
56 437 U.S. at 133. 
57 439 U.S. at 110-11. 
58 Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 124 (internal quotes and citations omitted).  
59 Id. at 124-25.  
60 Id. at 133.  
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regulation, and quoted language from Exxon to hold that to allow an antitrust 
challenge to anticompetitive state regulation would eviscerate this power.61 
The clear conflict necessary for preemption does not exist when states 
directly undertake regulatory schemes, as it does in the case of wage or rent 
controls, but it may exist when it delegates its regulatory authority to private 
entities.62  As the Court explained in Parker, a state cannot shield illegal 
conduct from the Sherman Act by “by authorizing them to violate it, or by 
declaring that their action is lawful.”63  The Court famously expanded on this 
point nearly thirty years later in Midcal, when it said that the state cannot save 
a regulatory scheme from preemption by placing a “gauzy cloak of state 
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.”64  In 
the antitrust preemption context, these comments have come to mean that the 
conflict necessary to condemn a state regulatory regime in the abstract can be 
found only when it “mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily 
constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or if it places irresistible 
pressure on a private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to comply with 
the statute.”65  Only conduct that constitutes a per se violation will “constitute[] 
a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases,” so state laws compelling conduct 
that would be judged under the rule of reason – such as a statute authorizing 
exclusive dealing, exclusive territories, or resale price maintenance – do not 
qualify for preemption.66  On the other hand, a statute mandating, authorizing, 
or placing “irresistible pressure” on private entities to engage in actions that 
constitute per se violations – e.g., naked horizontal price fixing and market 
allocation agreements – would be subject to preemption.67  
To deal with instances where the parties have formed no agreement, which 
is necessary to satisfy the plurality requirement of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, the Supreme Court has developed the concept of “hybrid restraints.”68  
Hybrid restraints are regulations that allow private parties to compel adherence 
to an anticompetitive agreement.  This concept arose in the context of cases 
involving laws that forced alcohol wholesalers to sell at prices set by 
 
61 Orrin W. Fox, 439 U.S. at 106-07, 111 (1978).  Dissenting in City of Boulder, Justice 
Rehnquist made a closer connection between antitrust and due process analysis, arguing that 
to subject municipalities to rule of reason claims would lead to the type of judicial 
micromanagement of state affairs that the Court repudiated in cases like Nebbia and West.  
Cmty. Commc’ns Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 67 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
62 See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 268 (1986).  What constitutes a private 
entity for state action purposes is an area of some contention.  See infra Part II.A.1.b.  
63 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). 
64 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980). 
65 Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982).   
66 See id.  
67 See id.; see also 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345 n.8 (1987).  
68 E.g., Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 267-68 (1986). 
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producers.69  Because these regulations in effect allowed upstream suppliers to 
set downstream prices, the Court analogized them to resale price maintenance 
agreements, which were at the time per se illegal.70  Hybrid restraints are to be 
contrasted with “unilateral” restraints, which involve the state directly dictating 
a market outcome, such as the rent control ordinance at issue in Fisher v. 
Berkeley.  The application of the hybrid restraint doctrine to laws that facilitate 
cartel behavior by requiring posting and holding of prices, has led to a great 
deal of confusion among lower courts.71   
Even if regulation authorizes conduct that would otherwise be per se illegal 
under the antitrust laws, it can still be saved from preemption if the state 
engages in sufficient oversight to convert private conduct into state action.72  
Thus, the antitrust laws reach only those state laws that permit or compel 
private entities to engage in unsupervised conduct that otherwise would result 
in per se illegal conduct.73  Although the required content of active supervision 
 
69 See, e.g., Rice, 458 U.S. at 665 (Stevens, J., concurring); 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. 
at 345 n.8.  
70 For example, in State Oil v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997), the Supreme Court held that 
maximum resale price maintenance agreements were no longer per se illegal under the 
Sherman Act.  Ten years later, in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 
U.S. 877, 908 (2007), the Supreme Court held that minimum resale price maintenance 
agreements were no longer per se illegal, and instead courts must use a circumstance-
specific “rule of reason.”  Id.  
71 Compare, e.g., Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 894 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding state regulation that required beer and wine wholesalers to post prices and adhere 
to them for thirty days to be a hybrid restraint and therefore subject to preemption by the 
Sherman Act), and TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 213 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding 
Maryland liquor regulation that required wholesalers to post and adhere to prices and 
prohibited volume discounts to be a hybrid restraint), with Mass. Food Ass’n v. Mass. 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n, 197 F.3d 560, 565-66 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that 
there are no private restraints “operating alone or in conjunction with state action” where a 
state statute limited licenses to three per company), and Battipaglia v. N.Y. State Liquor 
Auth., 745 F.2d. 166, 176 (2d Cir. 1984) (reasoning that there is a “grave question” whether 
a state regulation requiring wholesalers to post and maintain schedules of prices and 
discounts is enough to be a policy “actively supervised” by the state).  See infra notes 175-
80 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion.  
72 See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988) (reasoning that active supervision 
necessary to assure that private conduct “actually further state regulatory policies”).  
73 See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 104 
(1980); Rice, 458 U.S. at 661; Mass. Food Ass’n, 197 F.3d at 563-64 (“It is one thing to say 
that a state may itself regulate in an ‘anticompetitive’ fashion; it is quite another to say that 
the state can effectively exempt private parties from obeying the antitrust laws.”).  See also 
Garland, supra note 54, at 500, who observed: 
On the one hand, the Court did not believe Congress had intended the Sherman Act to 
“nullify” a state’s regulation of its own economy; on the other hand, it was equally sure 
that Congress would not have permitted a state to nullify the Sherman Act itself by 
“authorizing” private parties “to violate” the Act “or by declaring that their action is 
lawful.”  
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remains hazy,74 mere state authorization and enforcement of a private scheme 
will not suffice.  Rather, the state involvement must involve a “pointed 
reexamination” of the conduct at issue,75 sufficient to ensure that the state is 
“exerci[sing] ultimate control.”76 
The active supervision requirement has two rationales.  The first is explicit: 
the requirement seeks to assure political accountability.77  By actively 
supervising a price fixing scheme, state involvement will come into sharper 
focus.  As the Court explained in Ticor: 
States must accept political responsibility for actions they intend to 
undertake. . . .  Federalism serves to assign political responsibility, not to 
obscure it.  Neither federalism nor political responsibility is well served 
by a rule that essential national policies are displaced by state regulations 
intended to achieve more limited ends.  For States which do choose to 
displace the free market with regulation, our insistence on real 
compliance with both parts of the Midcal test will serve to make clear that 
the State is responsible for the price fixing that it has sanctioned and 
undertaken to control.78   
This sort of state “ownership” will help provide assurance that anticompetitive 
market outcomes are the result of deliberate state policy rather than merely 
private agreements.79   
The second rationale is implicit.  The requirement of active supervision 
raises the costs to states to implement anticompetitive programs, and costs to 
private parties who stand to benefit from such programs.80  For example, a 
state may no longer merely pass a law that allows attorneys to set “reasonable” 
fees for real estate closings.81  Rather, if the state desires regulation in this area, 
it must expend scarce resources to set up a regulatory regime that will examine 
the “reasonableness” of the prices private upon which the attorneys agree.82  
The attorneys, who desired the regulation, are also worse off.  Their proposed 
fees must undergo regulatory scrutiny, which probably reduces the scope for 
rent extraction and also imposes costs associated with navigating the 
 
74 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION 
TASK FORCE 22-24 (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf. 
75 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106. 
76 Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101. 
77 FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 635 (1992). 
78 Id. 
79 See id. at 634; Patrick, 486 U.S. at 106.  
80 See Richard Squire, Antitrust and the Supremacy Clause, 59 STAN. L. REV. 77, 119-20 
(2006) (arguing that the state must incur “public costs” to supervise a price setting regime). 
81 See Ticor, 504 U.S. at 638-39. 
82 See id. at 644-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
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regulatory landscape.  It also increases litigation risk for both the state and 
private parties subject to the regulatory scheme.83 
Although the active supervision requirement places strictures on state 
regulation, the Court has been clear that this requirement is about process 
rather than substance.  Active supervision is not an alternative way to reach a 
Lochner-like outcome.  As promised in Ticor, “the purpose of the active 
supervision inquiry is not to determine whether the State has met some 
normative standard, such as efficiency, in its regulatory practices,” but rather 
“to determine whether the State has exercised sufficient independent judgment 
and control so that the details of the rates or prices have been established as a 
product of deliberate state intervention, not simply by agreement among 
private parties.”84 
b. State Action Immunity for Non-Sovereign Actors 
The discussion thus far has concerned challenges to the constitutionality of 
state regulatory regimes.  Often, however, private parties acting pursuant to a 
state regulatory regime are the target of antitrust suits that do not necessarily 
seek to invalidate the state law.  These non-sovereign entities also can use the 
state action doctrine as a shield to avoid antitrust liability.  Consistent with the 
preemption jurisprudence, private parties can avail themselves of this 
immunity if they can show that they are (1) acting pursuant to a clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed state intent to displace competition with 
a regulatory scheme; and (2) actively supervised by the state.85  As noted 
above in the context of preemption, the rationale behind these requirements for 
immunity is that they provide the reviewing court with some assurance that the 
state has taken political ownership of the anticompetitive consequences 
flowing from the conduct at issue.86   
The Supreme Court has said that municipalities, although not the sovereign, 
are also not private parties, and consequently are subject only to the clear 
articulation prong.87  The treatment of non-sovereign subsidiaries of the state – 
such as regulatory boards or rate-setting commissions – remains unclear.  
Anticompetitive regulation promulgated by such boards that does not hew to a 
clear state policy is not immune from antitrust challenge.88  The extent to 
which these non-sovereign governmental entities need active supervision by 
 
83 See id. at 647 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
84 Id. at 634-35 (majority opinion).  
85 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).  
86 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
87 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985). 
88 For a regulatory board to satisfy the clear articulation standard it must both have the 
authority to regulate and be acting pursuant to an “authority to suppress competition” that is 
the “foreseeable result” of a clearly articulated state policy.  City of Columbia v. Omni 
Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1991). 
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some arm of the state is unsettled law.89  The Court has never directly weighed 
in on the treatment of other subsidiary state instrumentalities, but has hinted at 
least twice in dictum that state agencies are not private actors.90  In Town of 
Hallie, where the Court held that the active supervision requirement does not 
apply to municipalities, it further stated that “[i]n cases in which the actor is a 
state agency, it is likely that active state supervision would also not be 
required, although we do not here decide that issue.”91  In City of Lafayette v. 
Louisiana Power & Light Co., moreover, the Court rejected petitioner’s 
argument that Goldfarb applied only to private parties because “the State Bar, 
although a state agency by law acting in its official capacity, was somehow not 
a state agency because its official actions in issuing ethical opinions . . . 
benefited its member-lawyers by discouraging price competition.”92  The Court 
responded: “We think it obvious that the fact that the ancillary effect of the 
State Bar’s policy, or even the conscious desire on its part, may have been to 
benefit the lawyers it regulated cannot transmute the State Bar’s official 
actions into those of a private organization.”93  
At the same time, there are some appeals court decisions that suggest boards 
comprised of financially interested parties are private parties for state action 
purposes.  For example, in Washington State Electrical Contractors Ass’n v. 
Forrest, the Ninth Circuit held that a state “apprenticeship council,” which was 
 
89 Compare Hass v. Or. State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453, 1461 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that 
“that the Bar, as an agency of the State of Oregon, need not satisfy the ‘active supervision’ 
requirement to qualify for protection under the state action exemption”), and Town of 
Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46 n.10 (“In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that the 
active state supervision would also not be required, although we do not here decide that 
issue.”), with Crosby v. Hosp. Auth. of Valdosta & Lowndes Cnty., 93 F.3d 1515, 1524 
(11th Cir. 1996) (focusing on “whether the nexus between the State and the [agency in 
question] is sufficiently strong that there is little danger that the [agency] is involved in” 
private anticompetitive action”), and Wash. State Elec. Contractors Ass’n v. Forrest, 930 
F.2d. 736, 737 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding apprenticeship council could qualify as a state 
agency only if “the anticompetitive activity [is] supervised by the state itself”); FTC v. 
Monahan, 832 F.2d 688, 689-90 (1st Cir. 1987).  
90 See, e.g., S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 62-63 
(1985) (stating that a public utility commission not the “State itself”); Hoover v. Ronwin, 
466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984) (“Closer analysis is required when the activity at issue is not 
directly that of the legislature or supreme court, but is carried out by others pursuant to state 
authorization.”); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 789-90 (1975) (reasoning that 
attorney fee schedule established by county bar association was not immune from antitrust 
liability as the bar association was not a state agency); see also REPORT OF THE STATE 
ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 74, at 23-32 (analyzing state action immunity doctrine, and 
reasoning that “[a]t its core, the active supervision requirement serves to identify those 
responsible for public policy decisions”). 
91 Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46 n.10.   
92 City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 411 n.41 (1978) (internal 
citations omitted). 
93 Id. at 413.    
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established by statute and makes and enforce minimum wage rates for 
apprentices performing electrical contracts in Washington, was subject to the 
active supervision requirement.94  Noting that the council has “both public and 
private members, and the private members have their own agenda which may 
or may not be responsive to state labor policy,” the court remanded the case to 
the district court to “make specific findings and conclusions on both prongs” 
of Midcal.95  Federal Trade Commission v. Monahan concerned an appeal of 
an order to enforce an FTC subpoena on the grounds that the challenged 
activity – pharmacy board rules that restricted advertising and location of 
pharmacy branch locations – was immune under Parker.96  The court upheld 
the order to enforce the subpoena, noting that “where state regulation by a 
private party is involved and where there is a gauzy cloak of state involvement 
over what essentially is private anticompetitive activity, . . . the state, in order 
to obtain antitrust immunity, must supervise actively the activity in 
question.”97  The court went on to acknowledge that the Board, although a state 
agency, may be engaged in activities that “are ‘essentially’ those of private 
parties,” and that relevant to this inquiry was “how the Board functions in 
practice, and perhaps . . . the role played by its members who are private 
pharmacists.”98   
This uncertainty is troubling because non-sovereign entities are responsible 
for so much anticompetitive regulation, usually under the guise of consumer 
protection.99  Regulatory boards often can point to legislation that provides 
authority for their conduct making litigation based solely on a lack of “clear 
 
94 Forrest, 930 F.2d. at 737.   
95 Id. (emphasis added).  
96 FTC v. Monahan, 832 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1987).   
97 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).   
98 Id. at 690. 
99 For example, state dental boards, typically made up of practicing dentists, have 
promulgated regulations to limit competition from dental hygienists.  See S.C. State Bd. of 
Dentistry, No. 9311, 2007 WL 2763994 (F.T.C.) (Sep. 11, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9311/070911decision.pdf; Letter from FTC Staff to La. State 
Rep. Timothy Burns 5-6 (May 1, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/05/ 
V090009louisianadentistry.pdf.  Real estate boards, comprised of practicing real estate 
agents, have attempted to promulgate regulations to restrict limited service brokers and 
other novel business models.  See, e.g., United States v. Kentucky Real Estate Comm’n, 
Competitive Impact Statement, 70 Fed. Reg. 45424-25 (Aug. 5, 2005); Letter from FTC & 
DOJ Staff to Loretta DeHay, Gen. Counsel, Tex. Real Estate Comm’n 1 (Apr. 20, 2005), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/04/050420ftcdojtexasletter.pdf.  Additionally, state bar ethics 
committees, comprised of practicing attorneys, have issued ethics opinions that limit the 
provision of online legal services and attorney advertising.  See, e.g., Letter from FTC Staff 
to John Glancy, Chairman, Prof’l Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Tex. 1 (May 26, 2006), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/05/V060017CommentsonaRequestforAnEthicsOpinionImage.p
df; Letter from FTC Staff to Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, Ethics Counsel, Florida Bar 1 (Mar. 
23, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/be/V070002.pdf; supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.  
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articulation” risky in most cases.100  Absent an active supervision requirement, 
much of this conduct effectively will remain beyond the reach of antitrust laws, 
and thus largely undeterred.  
2. Noerr-Pennington 
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine takes its name from two cases in which the 
Supreme Court first attempted to interpret the Sherman Act in light of the First 
Amendment right to petition the government for redress.101  Since these early 
cases, the Supreme Court has revisited the issue a handful of times.  Taken 
together, these holdings sketch out a general rule that legitimate attempts to 
secure government action – legislative, regulatory, and judicial – are immune 
from antitrust scrutiny.102   
The Noerr doctrine rests on the primary principle of the right of citizens 
under the First Amendment to urge government action.  In Eastern Railroad 
Presidents’ Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., the Supreme Court 
stressed the “essential dissimilarity” between concerted lobbying of the 
government to act and the type of agreements that the Sherman Act typically 
confronts, such as price fixing, boycotts, and market divisions.103  The Court 
bolstered its interpretation that the Sherman Act does not reach the type of 
conduct at issue by noting that to conclude otherwise “would raise important 
constitutional questions.  The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected 
by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an 
intent to invade these freedoms.”104  More recently, the Court in both Federal 
Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n105 and Professional 
Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.106 has noted 
 
100 But see S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry, No. 9311, 2007 WL 2763994 (F.T.C.) (Sep. 11, 
2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9311/070911decision.pdf. 
101 See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); E. R.R. 
Presidents’ Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961).  The Court 
has always been careful to frame its Noerr-Pennington inquiries as ones of Sherman Act 
interpretation rather than resolution of a conflict between the First Amendment and the 
Sherman Act.  See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. 
(PREI), 508 U.S. 49, 57 (1993); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 
431-32 (1990); Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38.  
102 See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499 (1988).  
103 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136.  
104 Id. at 137-38. 
105 Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 424 (stating that the Court in Noerr was 
“[i]nterpreting the Sherman Act in the light of the First Amendment’s Petition Clause”). 
106 PREI, 508 U.S. at 56 (arguing that the Court in Noerr interpreted the Sherman Act, in 
part, to avoid imputing “‘to Congress an intent to invade’ the First Amendment right to 
petition”).  
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that the interpretation of the Sherman Act in Noerr rests on a desire to avoid 
conflict with the right to petition.107 
The rationale for Noerr also can be traced to other sources.  For example, in 
Noerr the Court expressed concern that a rule limiting citizens’ right to petition 
their government for anticompetitive rules may hinder governmental decision-
making, noting that “to a very large extent, the whole concept of representation 
depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known to their 
representatives.”108  Subjecting legitimate lobbying to antitrust scrutiny would 
deter this valuable conduct and hence “would substantially impair the power of 
government to take actions through its legislature and executive that operate to 
restraint trade.”109  The Supreme Court has echoed this basis for protecting 
certain petitioning activity in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited110 and Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures 
Industries, Inc.111   
The Court also has hinted that federalism concerns may underpin Noerr 
doctrine, at least when the case involves petitioning a state government.  For 
example, citing Parker v. Brown,112 the Court explained in Noerr:  
To hold that the government retains the power to act in this representative 
capacity and yet hold, at the same time, that the people cannot freely 
inform the government of their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act 
a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political activity, a 
 
107 The recent application of Noerr principles to the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”) provides additional insight into the role that the First Amendment plays in 
defining the scope of Noerr protection.  See BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 
524 (2001).  As in Noerr, the Court in BE & K turned to statutory construction to avoid the 
constitutional question, holding that the NLRB’s standard was invalid because there was 
nothing in the relevant statutory text to suggest that it “must be read to reach all reasonably 
based but unsuccessful suits filed with a retaliatory purpose.”  Id. at 536.  In light of the BE 
& K decision, the Ninth Circuit recently concluded that the Noerr doctrine “stands for a 
generic rule of statutory construction, applicable to any statutory interpretation that could 
implicate the rights protected by the Petition Clause.”  Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 
923, 931 (9th Cir. 2006); see also BE & K, 536 U.S. at 536 (“Under the Noerr-Pennington 
rule of statutory construction, we must construe federal statutes so as to avoid burdening 
conduct that implicates the protections afforded by the Petition Clause unless the statute 
clearly provides otherwise.”). 
108 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137. 
109 Id. 
110 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). 
111 508 U.S. at 56 (“In light of the government’s ‘power to act in [its] representative 
capacity’ and ‘to take actions . . . that operate to restrain trade,’ we reasoned that the 
Sherman Act does not punish ‘political activity through’ which ‘the people . . . freely inform 
the government of their wishes.’” (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137)). 
112 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
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purpose which would have no basis whatever in the legislative history of 
that Act.113  
Years later, the Supreme Court expanded on this notion in Omni, explaining 
that “Parker and Noerr are complementary expressions of the principle that the 
antitrust laws regulate business, not politics; the former decision protects the 
States’ acts of governing, and the latter the citizens’ participation in 
government.”114 
There are exceptions to Noerr’s general rule of petitioning immunity.  First, 
as the Court explained in Noerr, the antitrust laws would apply to petitioning 
that although “ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a 
mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere 
directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”115  Over the years, the 
Court has refined the definition of sham, anchoring it in the concept of 
“genuineness”; genuine attempts to secure governmental action are immune, 
but mere attempts to use the governmental process, as opposed to the outcome 
of that process, are not shielded from the antitrust laws.  Given the value that 
the Court has placed on First Amendment petitioning relative to competition, 
however, the evidentiary burdens to show such “sham petitioning” are 
formidable.  The Court has held that “genuine” has both objective and 
subjective components: plaintiffs must first make a showing that petitioning is 
“objectively baseless” before they can delve into the issue of whether the 
defendant’s petitioning was subjectively motivated to use the process to harm 
competition.116  At least in the context of a single lawsuit, the Supreme Court 
has held that a suit is objectively baseless when no reasonable litigant could 
expect success on the merits.117 
As we discuss in more detail in Part IV, the extent to which deceptive 
petitioning is protected remains unclear.  The Court has held that patents 
procured by fraud are not protected from antitrust suits, but has never 
considered whether a more general misrepresentation exception to Noerr 
exists.  Several lower courts, however, have held that attempts to procure 
favorable government action by fraud are not immune.118  Drawing on dicta in 
Allied Tube, which states that the degree of immunity should vary by the 
 
113 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137. 
114 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383 (1990). 
115 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.  
116 PREI, 508 U.S. at 56, 60 (outlining a two part definition of sham litigation which, 
under the Noerr doctrine, is excepted from immunity because such petitioning activity is a 
mere shame to cover an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a 
competitor).   
117 Id.  
118 See, e.g., Kottle v. Nw. Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 1998); St. Joseph’s 
Hosp., Inc. v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 795 F. 2d 948 (11th Cir. 1986); Israel v. Baxter Labs., 
Inc., 466 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. 
of Am., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971). 
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“nature and context” of the petitioning,119 these courts appear to have limited 
this exception to Noerr to instances involving adjudication rather than 
lobbying.120  Some lower courts also have crafted an exception to Noerr for 
petitions that seek only a ministerial response – that is, a response that is 
automatic and thus requires no government deliberation.  The underlying 
rationale for this exception is that requests for ministerial action do not involve 
petitioning in the first place, and thus do not implicate the First Amendment.121   
B. The Power of Persuasion: Competition Advocacy in the United States 
The economic theory of regulation posits that because of relatively high 
organizational and transaction costs, consumers will be disadvantaged relative 
to businesses in securing favorable regulation.122  This situation tends to result 
in regulations – such as unauthorized practice of law rules or minimum-service 
requirements for real estate brokers – that protect certain industries from 
competition at the expense of consumers.  Given the strictures imposed by the 
state action and Noerr-Pennington doctrines, this conduct is often beyond the 
reach of the antitrust laws.  
Broadly, through competition advocacy, the FTC and the DOJ (the 
“Agencies”) can use their expertise to persuade government entities to adopt 
policies that further (or at least do not impede) competition.  Competition 
advocacy often takes the form of letters to interested regulators, but also 
consists of formal submissions, testimony, amicus curiae briefs, studies, 
reports, and informal discussions.  By contrast, with the state action doctrine 
strictures that force competition agencies to focus only on process when using 
the antitrust laws to block a state restraint, advocacy focuses almost solely on 
the substance of the restraint at hand.  Most advocacy comments, for example, 
argue that because the Supreme Court has declared that the antitrust laws 
represent a national policy in favor of competition, the burden should rest on a 
state to justify restraints based on a market failure, and then to craft them only 
so broadly as necessary to achieve the competing public goal.123   
 
119 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1987). 
120 See FTC, ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE (2006) 
[hereinafter NOERR-PENNINGTON REPORT].  
121 See In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding 
that when deciding whether to extend Noerr-Pennington immunity to acts through which 
private parties seek to influence governmental decisions, it is critical to distinguish between 
activities in which the decision maker acts “only after an independent review of the merits 
of a petition,” and those in which the decision maker acts “in a merely ministerial or non-
discretionary capacity in direct reliance on the representations made by private parties”). 
122 See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., 
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 313-35 (3d ed. 2000). 
123 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the Federal Trade Commission and the United States 
of America at 9, McMahon v. Advanced Title Services Co. of W. Va., 607 S.E.2d 519 (W. 
Va. 2004) (No. 31706), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/V040017.pdf.  
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Competition advocacy helps solve consumers’ collective action problem by 
acting within the regulatory process to advocate for regulations that do not 
restrict competition unless there is a compelling consumer protection rationale 
for imposing such costs on citizens.124  By representing consumer interests in 
the regulatory process, the Agencies can affect outcomes in different ways.  
First, and most directly, advocacy can persuade a decision-maker to oppose 
regulation by presenting a compelling case that it restricts competition more 
than is necessary to promote some consumer protection goal, and therefore is 
not in the public interest.  At the same time, competitive advocacy can provide 
reasoned explanations that will help the decision-maker justify the decision to 
the public.  Second, to the extent that a comment informs the public of the way 
a proposed regulation is likely to affect them, it can spur political action, and 
thus increase the political costs associated with supporting anticompetitive 
regulation.  In this manner, competition advocacy can move the political 
equilibrium toward one that is more favorable to competition.  Finally, 
advocacy can provide “political cover” for public-spirited politicians seeking 
to benefit consumers but opposed by a powerful industry; regardless of 
whether a comment increases the political cost of supporting anticompetitive 
regulations, a politician can hide behind it as an excuse for not supporting a 
favored industry.   
The value of competition advocacy should be measured by (1) the degree to 
which comments altered regulatory outcomes times (2) the value to consumers 
of those improved outcomes.  For all practical purposes, however, both 
elements are difficult to measure with any degree of certainty.  There have 
been two formal attempts to measure the effectiveness of competition 
advocacy in the United States.  One study that assessed the advocacy 
program’s impact on regulatory outcomes between 1987-1989 and found that 
40% of comment recipients reported that the comments were at least 
“moderately effective,” meaning that “the governmental entity’s actions were 
totally or in large part consistent with at least some of the FTC’s 
recommendations, and that any action taken was largely or partly because of 
those recommendations.”125  The author concedes, however, that this “does not 
 
124 As the 1989 “Kirkpatrick Report” observes: 
The FTC’s competition advocacy program permits it to accomplish for consumers what 
prohibitive costs prevent them from tackling individually.  It is the potential for the 
FTC to undo governmentally imposed restraints that lessen consumer welfare, and to 
prevent their imposition, that warrants the program’s continuance and expansion.  
Because ill-advised governmental restraints can impose staggering costs on consumers, 
the potential benefits from an advocacy program exceed the Commission’s entire 
budget. 
Report of the American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Special Committee to 
Study the Role of Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 94 (1989).   
125 Arnold C. Celnicker, The Federal Trade Commission’s Competition and Consumer 
Advocacy Program, 33 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 379, 391 (1989).  Another 11% of the survey 
respondents found the comments to be “slightly effective,” meaning that “the governmental 
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establish that the FTC’s effect on those decisions improved them; that is what 
cannot be measured.”126  More recently, the FTC conducted a survey of 
advocacy recipients and sponsors of bills or regulation that the FTC opposed 
from 2001-2006.127  The study found that 53% of respondents agreed that the 
outcome of the regulatory process was largely consistent with the FTC 
position, and 54% of respondents (and 79% of those respondents who had an 
opinion) believed that the FTC comment influenced the outcome.  Further, 
81% of respondents responded that the fact that the comment came from the 
FTC caused them to give it more weight than they otherwise would.  
Although advocacy can play an important role in reducing government 
restraints on competition, it has some serious shortcomings.  First, and perhaps 
most importantly, advocacy can only inform the debate and suggest 
appropriate action; it cannot compel that action in the same manner as a 
tribunal.  Although advocacy can argue that states should not pursue policies 
that undermine the national policy of competition without sufficient 
empirically based justification, the antitrust preemption doctrine in its current 
form makes this line of argument a legal fiction: that the Supreme Court has 
declared a national policy in favor of competition is of no moment as long as 
the state restrains competition in a manner consistent with the state action 
doctrine.  This tension highlights one of the weaknesses of relying primarily on 
advocacy to curtain state restraints – there is no threat of legal sanction if the 
state refuses to heed the competition agency’s advice.  Further, although 
advocacy provides regulators with information concerning the likely economic 
consequences of a policy choice, the Agencies are not constituents; neither the 
FTC nor the DOJ can provide political support in the form of votes or 
campaign contributions.  Another important consideration is that the Agencies 
themselves are regulatory bodies and may be subject to political pressure from 
interest groups in much the same manner as federal or state agencies or 
legislatures.128  For example, due to complaints from adversely affected 
 
entity’s actions were to a small degree consistent with at least some of the FTC 
recommendations, and that any action taken was largely or partly because of those 
recommendations.”  Id.  Additionally, the author found that 47% of respondents gave the 
comments “substantial weight because [they] came from the FTC.”  Id. at 392.  In 1989, a 
virtually identical survey was sent by the Director of the FTC’s Advocacy Office to 
recipients of comments dated June 1, 1987 through June 2, 1989.  The responses to this 
second survey were consistent with those from the first.  (Results on file with authors). 
126 Celnicker, supra note 125, at 400. 
127 See DELEGATION OF UNITED STATES TO THE COMPETITION COMMITTEE, NOTE 
SUBMITTED FOR OECD ROUNDTABLE ON EVALUATION OF THE ACTIONS AND RESOURCES OF 
COMPETITION AUTHORITIES 7-8 (May 25, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/ 
international/docs/evalauth.pdf.  
128 See, e.g., Malcolm B. Coate, Richard S. Higgins & Fred S. McChesney, Bureaucracy 
and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges, 33 J.L. & ECON. 463 (1990); Timothy J. Muris, 
Regulatory Policymaking at the Federal Trade Commission: The Extent of Congressional 
Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 884, 888 (1986); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, 
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interest groups, in the late 1980s, Congress attempted to cripple, if not totally 
eliminate the FTC’s advocacy program.129  Further, Congress and the 
executive often apply more subtle pressure on the Agencies when competition 
advocacy activities threaten favored industry.  
III. THE TOOLKIT USED BY THE REST OF THE WORLD  
Many foreign competition systems provide stronger means than one sees in 
the United States to prevent or discourage government measures that suppress 
competition.130  They accomplish this in essentially two ways.  The first is to 
establish explicit legal commands that forbid or severely limit the ability of 
government institutions to curtail business rivalry.  For example, the 
competition provisions of the European Treaty and the jurisprudence of the 
community courts strictly circumscribe the power of EU member states to 
enact anticompetitive legislation or regulations.131  By these provisions and the 
Treaty’s prohibition on state aids, EU competition policy regime places heavy 
emphasis on achieving economic integration and forestalling member state 
actions that would frustrate its attainment.132  The laws of some jurisdictions 
make clear that state-owned enterprises are subject to the same competition 
policy commands as private firms.  Some competition systems enable the 
competition authority to veto government acts that curtail competition unless 
the restrictive measure has been approved by the national legislature.   
A second approach is to give the competition agency a seat at the table in 
the councils of government that make policy decisions about economic 
intervention.  In South Korea, for example, the Chair of the Korea Fair Trade 
Commission (“KFTC”) has the status of a minister and thus may participate in 
cabinet meetings as a regular member.133  This arrangement permits the KFTC 
chairman to advocate, at the highest levels of government, the adoption of pro-
 
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?  Regulatory Policymaking by the 
Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 792 (1983).   
129 Celnicker, supra note 125, at 421. 
130 See Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy Reform, supra note 2, at 400-04. 
131 Regarding state aids, see Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Arts. 107-
109, and legislation enacted thereunder.  See Competition, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/legislation.html (last visited July 6, 
2010).  For a description of the state aid rules, the procedures for their enforcement, and 
judicial review, see Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay, THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION 16:01 (2d 
ed. 2007).  Regarding other forms of anticompetitive actions by EU Member States, see 
generally Richard Wainwright & André Bouquet, State Intervention and Action in EC 
Competition Law, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY: FORDHAM CORPORATE 
LAW INSTITUTE 539, 540 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2003). 
132 Other than weak protections supplied by the Commerce Clause, the United States has 
no equivalent to the EU’s ban upon state aids. 
133 Korea Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Art. 38 (2); see also OECD Review 
of Regulatory Reform in Korea 187 (2000); Overview, KOREA FREE TRADE COMM’N, 
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/about/overview.jsp (last visited June 10, 2010). 
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competition policies.  Such measures give the competition agency a stronger 
platform to become directly involved in decisions made by other public 
ministries and to participate more actively in decisions about responses to 
economic crisis conditions. 
IV. A PATH FORWARD FOR U.S. COMPETITION POLICY: TWO APPROACHES 
THAT WOULD PROVIDE A STRONGER ROLE FOR THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY 
VIS-À-VIS THE STATE 
Broadly, there are two ways in which a competition authority can challenge 
anticompetitive abuse of the regulatory process.  It can engage policy makers 
to achieve ex ante changes, or it can challenge anticompetitive regulation ex 
post under the antitrust laws.  The U.S. competition authorities are severely 
circumscribed in both cases: FTC and DOJ can engage in advocacy, but have 
no formal authority to veto policy; the state action and Noerr-Pennington 
doctrines leave a vast array of anticompetitive conduct beyond the reach of 
enforcement.  
In what follows, we consider modifications of existing antitrust doctrine and 
the institutional role of the competition authority that would provide a larger 
scope for both ex ante and ex post interventions.  
A. Reconsideration of Legal Protection of State-Imposed Restrictions 
As currently construed by the courts, the state action and Noerr-Pennington 
doctrines sweep too far, protecting anticompetitive conduct that harms 
consumers and advances neither the values of federalism nor freedom of 
speech.  There are two possible corrective paths.  First, the Supreme Court 
could reconsider some of its state action and Noerr-Pennington holdings.  
Second, as it has done in the past to correct perceived Supreme Court missteps, 
Congress could amend the antitrust laws to limit these antitrust doctrines.  
However, the extent to which these doctrines represent more than merely 
judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act, and instead suggest constitutional 
limits to the application of the antitrust laws, will present limits to the ability of 
either the courts or Congress to expose a larger set of state action and 
petitioning activity to antitrust scrutiny.  
At the very least, going forward, the U.S. competition authorities should 
strive to contain the growth of these immunities through targeted Amicus 
briefs and advocacy opportunities.  We also suggest, however, that the 
competition agencies engage in an affirmative program using both its 
enforcement and advocacy tools to move these doctrines in a more 
competition-friendly direction, which we detail below. 
1. State Action 
To narrow the reach of the state action doctrine requires expanding the 
current zone of conflict between state economic regulation and federal antitrust 
laws.  The reach of the antitrust laws, and thus the size of this zone, in turn, 
rests on how far Congress intended the antitrust laws to intrude into state 
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affairs.134  Calls to reform the state action doctrine have a long pedigree and 
range from minor tweaks in existing doctrine to wholesale overalls.  Some 
early critiques of the doctrine introduced public choice theory to argue that the 
antitrust laws should preempt all anticompetitive or inefficient state 
regulation,135 or at least inefficient regulation that appears to be the product of 
capture.136  The underlying rationale behind these proposals is that, when 
captured, the state becomes a mere vessel for private interests.  When there is 
evidence that the process is tainted with private interests, there is no reason to 
suspect a regulatory scheme represents state action, and thus no reason for the 
courts to hold the antitrust laws in abeyance.  More recent critiques have taken 
two paths to argue for a narrowing of state action immunity.  Some attempt to 
divine congressional intent to fashion optimal boundaries between federal 
antitrust laws and state regulation.  Others argue that the state action doctrine 
should be bound by the extent to which it vindicates principles of federalism.  
That is, there is no reason to assume that Congress did not intend the Sherman 
Act to reach anticompetitive state conduct.  So the only limiting principle on 
this intent should be the extent to which Sherman Act intrusion impermissibly 
interferes with state sovereignty.   
In an influential paper, Professor Einer Elhauge argues that the underlying 
rationale for the state action doctrine can be found in an interpretation of the 
antitrust laws.137  He examines the legislative history of the Sherman Act and 
suggests that antitrust is at its core about prohibiting only those restraints that 
are the result of self-interested decision-makers.138  Thus, a decision to restrain 
competition by a disinterested, politically accountable actor – such as a state 
legislator or governor, or someone accountable to such an elected official – is 
beyond the Sherman Act’s reach.139  Professor Elhauge’s analysis is primarily 
descriptive, and he does not suggest an alteration in the current doctrine except 
for urging the Court openly to acknowledge the underlying forces driving its 
state action jurisprudence. 
 
134 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484-86 (1996).  
135 See, e.g., John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the “State-Municipal Doctrine” 
Antitrust Cases, 61 TEX. L. REV. 481, 514-15 (1982) (proposing rules for determining the 
validity of competitive displacement and proposing reserving minimal state power to 
regulate). 
136 See, e.g., John Shepherd Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 713, 743 (1986). 
137 See Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV L. REV. 668, 
668 (1991). 
138 See id. 
139 See id.  Although Professor Elhauge states that his process inquiry is distinct from a 
public/private distinction, we tend to agree with Professors McGowan and Lemley that it is 
merely redefining – there is no meaningful difference between a public official and 
Professor Elhauge’s “disinterested, politically accountable” decision-maker.  See David 
McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, 
Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 328 (1994).  
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Also focusing on interpretation of the Sherman Act, Professor Richard 
Squire contends that the problem with the antitrust preemption doctrine is that 
it confuses issues of whether there has been an antitrust violation with 
Supremacy Clause questions.140  He suggests retaining the current Midcal 
framework for implied exemption questions – that is, those that involve a 
defendant using the existence of an anticompetitive state law as a shield from 
antitrust liability – but scrapping the existing preemption framework for one 
that focuses more clearly on whether the state regulation in question conflicts 
with the purpose behind the federal antitrust laws.141  Professor Squire 
examines the core values of the antitrust laws and concludes that a preemption 
test that focuses on consumer harm and producer enrichment, with important 
limitations, would vindicate congressional intent.142  Conceding that laws that 
transfer wealth from consumers to producers are ubiquitous,143 Professor 
Squire suggests allowing laws that bundle consumer benefits with producer 
benefits144 and those that pursue “fair” or “reasonable” prices.145  
Professors Daniel Rubinfeld and Robert Inman do not focus on 
congressional intent, but rather argue that the state action doctrine in its current 
 
140 See Squire, supra note 80, at 77. 
141 See id. 
142 See id. 
143 Id. at 106.  
144 See id. at 111-13.  Under this framework, Professor Squire argues that laws that create 
entry barriers would be immune because they “do not raise prices in the manner ideally 
suited for enriching a given set of producers.”  Id. at 112.  Although we do not disagree with 
the ultimate conclusion – that entry barrier restrictions should not be preempted – we 
disagree with his characterization of entry barriers.  They do not, as Professor Squire argues, 
raise prices because they force firms to move up increasing marginal cost curves.  See id. at 
113.  Rather, entry barriers harm consumers by eliminating marketplace options and, when 
low-cost competitors are excluded (as is the case in typical entry-barrier legislation), 
depriving of them of competition between low-and high cost producers.  For example, a 
restriction on limited-service brokers does not harm consumers because it forces existing 
full-service brokers to incur higher marginal costs by handling more transactions.  Rather, 
they deprive consumers of a novel marketplace option that may better suit their preferences, 
and it deprives them of the lower prices and enhanced quality and service from full-service 
brokers that is likely to accompany competition from limited service brokers.  The same 
analysis applies to barriers erected to keep online sellers at bay or to prevent non-attorneys 
from performing routine legal tasks.  Professor Squire’s scenario holds only in the special 
case where incumbent and entrant firms produce similar goods or services and enjoy similar 
costs structures.     
145 Id. at 116.  Under this test, Professor Squire would allow a state regulatory scheme to 
stand if there is evidence that the regulator took consumer interests into account when 
determining prices.  He suggests that evidence that the state is involved in pricing decisions 
is likely sufficient evidence of the pursuit of “fair” prices in most cases because it suggests 
that the state voluntarily has incurred “public costs” that could be avoided if its purpose was 
only to enrich producers without regard to consumers’ interests.  Id. at 119.  
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form is approximately optimal in securing the goals of federalism.146  Like 
Professor Elhauge, they believe that the current doctrine tends to immunize 
only that state action that is likely to be a product of a process that represents 
the “public interest.”147  They would suggest only modifications for interstate 
spillovers and municipalities.148  Professors Lemley and McGowan also argue 
that the roots of state action immunity are federalism, not an interpretation of 
the antitrust laws.149  Accordingly, they posit that only those state laws that can 
be truly said to be the product of state, rather than private action, should be 
immune.150  They suggest that the antitrust laws have given too much ground 
to anticompetitive state regulation, and offer an augmented Midcal test that 
would narrow the scope of state action immunity.151  Specifically, they suggest 
that in addition to demanding that a policy be clearly articulated and actively 
supervised, that the courts also should inquire into two additional factors to 
determine the extent to which it can be said that the regulation in question is 
the product of capture or true democratic governance: (1) whether the 
regulation was urged by a private, economically interested actor or interest 
group; and (2) whether the policy discriminates in favor of certain competitors 
at the expense of others.152  Neither of these factors would be determinative, 
but rather would be probative of the extent to which the regulatory program is 
the result of capture rather than legitimate governance.153  
Although these analyses of state action have much to commend them, we 
note a few areas of caution.  First, any viable approach to reconcile the 
antitrust laws with anticompetitive state regulation must focus on the process 
that led to the restraints rather than its economic effect.  For this reason, 
suggestions to improve the state action doctrine by evaluating the efficiency of 
a regulation should be discarded; these reforms are probably undesirable from 
a policy standpoint, and would be politically and jurisprudentially infeasible.  
 
146 See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-
Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory 
Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1298 (1997). 
147 See id. 
148 See id. 
149 McGowan & Lemley, supra note 139, at 293. 
150 Id. at 357 (“[T]he fundamental principal of federalism at issue in the state action cases 
is the distinction between states (or local governments) acting in their governance capacity 
and those acting merely to barter private immunity from the antitrust laws.  States are 
entitled to deference when they are pursuing a legislative program toward some policy end, 
but not when they are simply enacting without significant review the anticompetitive 
policies proposed to them by private actors who stand to benefit.”).  
151 See id. at 358. 
152 Id.  
153 See id. at 359-60.  For example, evidence that a company was the primary proponent 
of a regulation that benefits it at the expense of its competitors may be strongly suggestive 
that the state was merely a vessel to vindicate private anticompetitive interests rather than 
democratic preferences. 
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At the most basic level, allowing federal courts to overrule state legislative 
judgments on tradeoffs between competition and other social values is an 
affront to democratic values; if citizens, through their elected representatives, 
choose to forego the benefits of competition to pursue another value, they 
should be allowed to do so.  Apart from democratic concerns, it deprives the 
nation of the benefits of federalism – letting states adopt solutions that more 
closely fit the preferences of their populations,154 and allowing the nation as 
whole to learn from this variation.155   
A movement in this direction also would require the Court to overrule sixty 
years of precedent that rests on an interpretation of a relatively unchanged 
statute.  Even if it could deliver a cogent rationale for such a stark departure 
from stare decisis, the Court would be forced to perform world-class 
jurisprudential gymnastics to distinguish antitrust preemption challenges to 
state regulation from Lochner-esque challenges to the same thing.  Although 
they could facially be challenged as concerning different constitutional clauses 
– substantive rights are included in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause versus the Supremacy Clause – it may be distinction without a 
difference as it would end in the same way: federal courts second-guessing the 
efficiency of state economic regulation.156  An easier way to achieve this result 
would probably be for Congress to amend the antitrust laws to note explicitly 
that it intended to supplant anticompetitive state regulation.  Of course, this 
approach would be politically infeasible as both sides of the aisle have roundly 
excoriated the Lochner era: from the right, a return to Lochner is an affront to 
states’ rights and the ability to craft local solutions to local problems; from the 
left, Lochner represents blind obedience to the free market without regard to 
market failures.157 
When an anticompetitive restraint rightly can be considered the product of 
the state rather than private interests, federalism concerns counsel against 
application of the antitrust laws.  Probing the process that gives rise to a 
regulatory scheme can shed light on this question.  Inquiries that go beyond the 
 
154 See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 146, at 1217-18 (1997). 
155 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould through experimentation, our 
economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs.”).  
156 Cmty. Commc’n Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(forcing a municipality to defend the reasonableness of an anticompetitive regulation “on 
the basis that its benefits to the community outweigh its anticompetitive effects” will cause 
courts “to review social legislation in a manner reminiscent of the Lochner era” (citation 
omitted)).  But see Wiley, supra note 136, at 779.  Wiley argues that these inquires would be 
distinct because an inquiry into efficiency under an antitrust preemption case does not 
impose a constitutional mandate for free markets, as a Due Process challenge does, but 
rather merely represents a congressional preference for free markets, which can be revoked.  
Thus, the courts are merely vindicating congressional intent rather than forcing their own 
preferences for free markets onto states.  
157 See Squire, supra note 80, at 104.  
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process and examine the political forces that shaped the regulation, however, 
have the potential to slide into a review of substance rather than process.  For 
example, evaluating a regulatory scheme on its face to distinguish state 
programs that serve the “public interest” from those that are merely designed 
to enrich favored producers will force the development of normative criteria by 
which to judge the “public interest.”158  Even milder forms of this inquiry that 
ask only whether lobbying occurred in effect create a presumption that the 
ultimate regulatory outcome in the presence of lobbying is almost surely 
tainted with private interest rather than a representation of a politically 
accountable decision-maker’s view of the public interest.  Such a presumption, 
again, would require courts to judge the regulatory scheme pushed by private 
interests, and ultimately adopted, against some normative criteria.159  
Inquiry into regulatory causation also poses administrative and 
constitutional concerns.  First, as others have pointed out, trying to tease out 
the true motivations behind a regulatory scheme is difficult – most lobbying 
efforts to obtain regulation that impairs competition at the expense of another 
group are opposed.160  When the anticompetitive outcome is achieved, it would 
be a purely subjective judgment to say that a state legislature adopted the 
anticompetitive policy because its members were “captured,” rather than 
because they believed the adopted policy was in the public interest.  The Court 
stressed this point in Omni, where it closed the door on any conspiracy 
exception that does not involve the state as a market participant, and eschewed 
inquiries that would examine extrinsic evidence, including evidence of bribery, 
to discern whether state actors who adopt anticompetitive legislation are truly 
concerned with the public interest.161  As in other areas of antitrust law, 
liability rules based on speculative assessments of subjective intent should be 
avoided, especially when error costs are likely to be high.  And, they are likely 
to be high in these cases – the possibility of ex post liability may chill 
willingness to lobby for, or to enact, regulation or legislation.   
This brings us to our constitutional point.  The Court has been clear since 
Noerr that First Amendment concerns counsel an interpretation of the antitrust 
laws that do not reach lobbying for even anticompetitive regulation.  The same 
caution in Noerr applies with equal force here.  Explorations into the extent to 
which industry lobbyists shape governmental officials’ motives are likely to 
 
158 See McGowan & Lemley, supra note 139, at 360 (advocating the examination of 
regulation to determine if it discriminates among producers within the same industry); 
Squire, supra note 80, at 112 (advocating examination of text of regulations to see if they 
have mixed beneficiaries rather than merely enriching producers); Wiley, supra note 136, at 
770-71 (advocating examination of text to determine if it clearly benefits one group of 
producers and advances no plausible legitimate public interest).   
159 See Elhauge, supra note 137, at 723.  
160 See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 375, 377 (1991).  
161 See id. at 375, 378-79.  
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deter petitioning that is protected by the First Amendment.162  Any rule that 
chills this protected behavior runs the risk of impinging on the First 
Amendment.  This point seems in some ways a corollary to the Court’s 
statement in Omni that it would be “peculiar in a democracy, and perhaps in 
derogation of the constitutional right to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances, to establish a category of lawful state action that citizens are not 
permitted to urge.”163  If this statement is true, it appears equally true that 
courts cannot narrow the states’ ability to regulate based on the degree to 
which such regulation derives from First Amendment protected speech.   
With the above admonitions in mind, we offer a hybrid approach that 
focuses both on vindicating congressional intent behind the antitrust laws and 
federalism principles, but would retain much of the Court’s current framework.  
Specifically, below we argue that fealty to congressional intent should lead to 
preemption of a broader class of laws than only those that promote or permit 
unsupervised per se illegal conduct.  We also contend that to the extent that 
federalism animates the preemption question, courts should be more willing to 
find clear conflict with the antitrust laws when state-imposed restrictions on 
competition are the product of regulatory boards comprised of private actors or 
result in costs that are predominantly exported to neighboring states.  
Broadening the concept of “inherent conflict.”  As described above, current 
preemption doctrine finds an inherent conflict only when a law mandates or 
authorizes unsupervised per se illegal conduct.  Although some have criticized 
this approach,164 we believe that it is consistent with the broader strain of 
conflict preemption doctrine that strikes down state laws only when they 
directly frustrate the purpose of a federal regulatory regime.  Determining 
whether conflict exists in the first place is a fairly easy exercise when the 
federal and state regimes set out specific standards, for example, parts-per-
million of a pollutant.  What differentiates antitrust preemption from 
preemption in other areas is that Congress set out notoriously vague antitrust 
 
162 Wiley recognizes this potential but argues that allowing petitioning for efficient 
regulations and exemptions from the antitrust laws would sufficiently vindicate firms’ First 
Amendment rights.  See Wiley, supra note 136, at 779-80.    
163 Omni, 499 U.S. at 379 (citation omitted).  Omni further stated: 
Insofar as the identification of an immunity-destroying “conspiracy” is concerned, 
Parker and Noerr generally present two faces of the same coin. . . .  The same factors 
which . . . make it impracticable or beyond the purpose of the antitrust laws to identity 
and invalidate lawmaking that has been infected by selfishly motivated agreement with 
private interests likewise make it impracticable or beyond that scope to identity and 
invalidate lobbying that has produced selfishly motivated agreement with public 
officials.  
Id. at 383. 
164 See Squire, supra note 80, at 93-96.  
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standards that the courts have filled in through common law.165  Unlike the 
case of an environmental law that requires the Environmental Protection 
Agency to set a ceiling for pollutant levels, we can know which state laws 
conflict with the antitrust laws only by knowing what conduct violates the 
antitrust laws, and we can only know this by looking at what federal courts 
have said violate the antitrust laws.  In this manner, the federal courts have 
acted as bureaucrats, promulgating regulations that flesh out more precise 
standards of conduct.166  Setting aside more than one hundred years of 
precedent that let us know, broadly, what conduct is likely to violate the 
antitrust laws to develop a parallel set of core principles that should guide 
preemption inquiries is likely to be confusing, inefficient, and facilitate judicial 
oversight of state regulatory decisions.167   
A more modest, and hence more feasible, solution than scrapping the Midcal 
approach to preemption, would be for the Court to expand the class of private 
unsupervised conduct that necessarily conflicts with the antitrust laws, and thus 
is subject to preemption.  In its current formulation, the Court has said that 
clear conflict exists when a law causes a private party to violate the antitrust 
laws in all cases.168  The only type of conduct that satisfies this standard is that 
which constitutes a per se violation – unlike unilateral acts or conduct that is 
reviewed under the rule of reason, courts will not entertain any efficiency 
defenses to this class of behavior;169 thus a statute authorizing per se illegal 
behavior, creates a conflict with the antitrust laws with one hundred percent 
likelihood.  There are, however, regulatory schemes that do not authorize 
parties to engage in per se violations, but rather authorize or compel them to 
engage in conduct that is highly likely to facilitate conduct that violates the 
antitrust laws.  Several states, for example, require wholesalers of alcoholic 
beverages to post their future prices with the state agency in a manner that 
allows them to share price information with their competitors, and to hold 
these prices for a certain period of time, often thirty to sixty days.170  These 
 
165 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175, 1183 (1989) (“One can hardly imagine a prescription more vague than the Sherman 
Act’s prohibition of contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade.”).  
166 See Wiley, supra note 136, at 777.  See generally Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust 
Antifederalism, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2008) (arguing that antifederalist tendencies led 
Congress to allow the substantive standards in antitrust to develop through common law 
rather than from a federal regulation).   
167 For example, under Squire’s proposal, Midcal would not be preempted because the 
resale price maintenance scheme at issue in that case was likely efficient, and thus did not 
serve solely to enrich producers.  See Squire, supra note 80, at 123-24.  This scenario would 
involve evaluating the efficiency of the state program.  See id. 
168 See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.   
169 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Per Se Violations in Antitrust: Confusing Offenses with 
Defenses, 77 GEO. L.J. 165, 178 (1988).   
170 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-63 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 23-1029 (2010); 
GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 560-2-3.45 (2010); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 45:30-3-7 (2010). 
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post-and-hold rules neither mandate nor authorize wholesalers to engage in 
price fixing, but the regulatory regime makes such collusive agreements highly 
likely.171  Courts do not condemn private agreements to share future prices per 
se.172  Nonetheless, they should be treated with a high degree of suspicion 
given their ability to facilitate tacit or explicit collusion. 
Consonant with the underlying antitrust analysis of inherently suspect 
arrangements, preemption analysis of regulatory regimes that appear very 
likely to facilitate per se illegal behavior should start with a rebuttable 
presumption that these laws are in clear conflict with the antitrust law.173  A 
plaintiff will meet its burden of persuasion with, for example, market structure 
evidence suggesting that the market in question is conducive to collusion or 
empirical evidence that similar regulations have led to collusion in other 
markets.  This presumption would be sharply strengthened if a plaintiff can 
show that those subject to a regulatory regime actually have engaged in per se 
illegal behavior, either through direct documentary and testimonial evidence or 
econometric evidence that pricing patterns are more likely the product of 
collusion than competition.  The burden of persuasion would then shift to the 
defendant to prove that the regulatory regime is not likely to facilitate per se 
illegal behavior with, for example, evidence that contradicts plaintiff’s 
characterization of the market’s predisposition to per se illegal behavior.  In the 
case that there is evidence of actual per se conduct, to avoid preemption, the 
state would have to show that the regulatory regime was not a facilitator.174 
 
171 In one case, for example, a wholesaler testified that he and rival wholesalers used the 
public posting to reach an agreement on a new price for beer.  See Miller v. Hedlund, 717 F. 
Supp. 711, 714 (D. Or. 1989) (“Maletis testified that in 1986 . . . his wholesale business and 
one of the largest beer and wine wholesalers in the State of Oregon, used the price posting 
exchange at the OLCC as a starting point for communicating with competing wholesalers of 
keg beer until agreement was reach by all wholesalers of keg beer on a new wholesale price 
for keg beer.”); see also James C. Cooper & Joshua D. Wright, State Regulation of Alcohol 
Distribution: The Effects of Post-and-Hold Laws on Output and Social Harms (George 
Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 10-32, 2010) (finding that post-and-hold 
laws raise reduce consumption of alcoholic beverages but do not have any effect on drunk 
driving or underage drinking), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1641415. 
172 See United States v. Citizens S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975). 
173 See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2113 (3d ed. 
2006) (“[W]e would consider directly interseller communications of current prices on 
specific transactions to be ‘nearly naked’ restraints subject only to a quick look for possible 
cost reducing or output increasing circumstances.”). 
174 This approach is the analog to the rule used by courts presented with evidence of 
information exchange and parallel pricing, which requires the plaintiff to establish a link 
between the information exchange and the parallel pricing that excludes the possibility of 
unilateral conduct.  See Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 
1034 (8th Cir. 2000) (requiring plaintiffs to show that information exchanges had an effect 
on pricing).  In our proposed framework, the burden is on the defendant to provide evidence 
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Shifting the focus in this manner could have the collateral benefit of helping 
to clear up the currently messy concept of “hybrid restraints” as it is applied to 
horizontal restraints.  As noted above, the Supreme Court developed the notion 
of hybrid restraints to create the fiction of agreement in preemption cases 
involving government regulation that required downstream sellers to adhere to 
prices set by upstream suppliers.175  Lower courts have had difficulty applying 
this concept, however, to regimes that create conditions that are likely to 
facilitate collusive agreements, but which neither authorize nor mandate 
collusion.176  For example, some courts addressing post-and-holds have held 
that the state-mandated price holding acts as an agreement to hold prices 
constant, which is a per se violation under Supreme Court precedent.177  
Although from a policy standpoint, striking down these post-and-hold laws is 
desirable, the legal reasoning to reach the result is suspect.  It is hard to 
distinguish the rent ceiling ordinance in Fisher from the required holding 
requirement.  If the Court in Fisher was clear that the fact that all landlords had 
to abide by the rent ceiling did not transform the ordinance into a 
conspiracy,178 it is unclear how an ordinance that compels wholesalers to hold 
their prices can be transformed into a price fixing arrangement.  Neither regime 
mandates or allows per se illegal behavior, but rather requires each producer 
unilaterally to following a state-invented pricing rule.  That is, unlike the resale 
price maintenance schemes at issue in Midcal and Schwegmann,179 the 
government, as opposed to private parties, have restrained pricing freedom.180  
By keeping the focus on the natural or likely unsupervised private behavior – 
per se illegal price fixing or market allocation – that flows from the state-
compelled conduct, our proposed test would avoid the current doctrinal mess 
and lead to results consistent with Fisher. 
 
that tends to exclude the possibility that the observed pricing was not the product of the 
regulatory regime.  
175 See Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 340 (1987) (authorizing a regulatory 
scheme that allowed wholesalers to dictate retail margins); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n 
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 99-100 (1980) (authorizing a scheme whereby 
wholesalers were required to adhere to manufacturer-set price schedule).  
176 See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 887 (9th Cir. 2008); Freedom 
Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 224 n.7 (2d Cir. 2004); TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 
F.3d 198, 210 (4th Cir. 2001); Battipaglia v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 173 (2d 
Cir. 1984); Flying J., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 597 F. Supp. 2d. 848, 857 (E.D. Wis. 2009); Lotus 
Bus. Grp. LLC v. Flying J., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1023 (E.D. Wis. 2007).  
177 Costco Wholesale, 522 F.3d at 895 (citing Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 
U.S. 643, 649-50 (1980)); TFWS, 242 F.3d at 209-10 (citing Catalano, 446 U.S. at 649-50).  
178 See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 267 (1986) (“[T]he mere fact that all 
competing property owners must comply with the same provision of the Ordinance is not 
enough to establish a conspiracy among landlords.”).  
179 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). 
180 See Fisher, 475 U.S. at 269. 
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In theory, Congress could accomplish such a modification of the state 
action, but it would be hard to envision a legislative fix that would neither be 
over- nor under-inclusive in defining ex ante the set of circumstances that 
merit a rebuttable presumption of preemption.  Courts fashion rules that govern 
antitrust analysis based on cumulative experience and economic learning.181  
Indeed, these factors have led courts to move certain practices from the per se 
column to the rule of reason column,182 and to develop strong presumptions of 
illegality for other restraints.183  Thus, given the needed flexibility in defining 
the exact nature of the government restraint, this modification should be 
accomplished judicially.  
Treatment of regulatory boards comprised of private actors.  Another tweak 
at the margins of the state action doctrine would be to make it clear that 
subdivisions within the state comprised of market participants are considered 
private parties.  As discussed in Part I.B, this uncertainty has important 
negative consequences for competition policy.  Much anticompetitive conduct 
is not the result of legislation, but rather emanates from regulatory boards 
made up of decision makers who wear their regulatory hat at the board’s 
monthly meetings, but earn a living in the very profession that they have been 
charged to regulate the other 353 days of the year.184  Given their financial self 
interest, there seems to be no principled reason to consider these actors 
 
181 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886-87 (2007) 
(“[T]he per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with 
the type of restraint at issue,  and only if courts can predict with confidence that it would be 
invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of reason.  It should come as no 
surprise, then, that ‘we have expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules with regard to 
restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic impact of 
certain practices is not immediately obvious.’”(citations omitted)); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. 
FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (stating that the ability of a court to draw “a confident 
conclusion about the principal tendency of a restraint . . . may vary over time, if rule-of-
reason analyses in case after case reach identical conclusions”); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 
U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“[W]e have expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules with regard to 
restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic impact of 
certain practices is not immediately obvious.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); FTC v. 
Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986) (exhibiting hesitancy to condemn and 
subject particular conduct to unreasonable per se analysis, and, in general, to extend per se 
analysis to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic 
impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia 
Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (“[I]t is only after considerable experience with certain 
business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[A]s 
economic learning and market experience evolve, so too will the class of restraints subject 
to summary adjudication.”). 
182 See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886-87; Khan, 522 U.S. at 20. 
183 See Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459; Polygram Holding, 416 F.3d at 36. 
184 For example, most real estate commissions, state bar ethics committees, and boards of 
dentistry are comprised of practitioners.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 99.   
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anything but private.185  Treating these actors as private parties would have two 
implications: first a state law that delegated to a board or commission 
comprised of private actors the ability to engage in unsupervised per se illegal 
conduct – for example, setting prices or banning advertising – would be 
preempted; second, the state entity itself would be subject to an antitrust suit if 
it were not supervised by a sovereign state component. 
Of course, critics of this approach may argue that it allows an unacceptable 
level of federal oversight of state regulations.  When state boards are rightly 
characterized as private actors, however, there is no reason for courts not to 
explore the anticompetitive effects of their concerted action in that same way 
they would for private corporations that unsuccessfully tried to take refuge in 
the state action doctrine.  At the same time, several important firewalls would 
be built into such a framework to prevent unwarranted judicial intervention 
into state affairs.  First, antitrust claims can be directed only at state regulation 
that impairs competition.  For example, some state safety regulations may be 
unwise from a policy standpoint – imposing costs greater than benefits – but, 
because it applies equally to all firms, would not be subject to antitrust 
challenge because there is no underlying antitrust violation.  On the other hand, 
a regulation that fixes commission rates or erects entry barriers for low-cost 
competitors clearly implicates competition.   
This proposal also presents the same concern that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
raised in his City of Boulder dissent: if the regulatory board is to be treated as a 
private entity (or a collection of private interests) for antitrust purposes, should 
it be allowed to justify anticompetitive actions with other societal goals?186  
Clearly, under National Society of Professional Engineers, courts will not 
accept the defense from private parties that competition itself is undesirable.  
Of course, to limit a state board to defend its actions without reference to non-
competition values would be to ignore their nature; as creatures of the state, 
they are charged with making policy based on considerations beyond 
competition and it would be unfair to penalize them for taking these values into 
account.187  But, if we grant state agencies an exception from National Society 
of Professional Engineers’s strictures on defenses, however, do we risk a 
return to Lochner-ian federal oversight of state affairs?  Although these 
concerns are not without merit in the context of municipal regulation by 
 
185 See 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 173, at ¶ 228 (recommending classifying as 
private any organization in which the decisive coalition is made up of market participants). 
186 See Cmty. Commc’n Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 67 (1982) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting).  
187 The analysis that follows implicitly applies to per se offenses too.  Although private 
parties are barred from offering defenses to per se offenses because the court has deemed 
them to be anticompetitive in almost all cases, the same bar would not apply to state boards 
that enact per se illegal regulations because they will be able to offer non-competition 
benefits to justify the almost certain anticompetitive effects their policy.   
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elected city officials, they are insufficient to insulate state boards comprised of 
market participants from antitrust scrutiny.   
First, fealty to federalism may counsel giving state sovereigns (legislatures, 
supreme courts acting in legislative capacity, and likely the executive) wide 
berth when developing policy that has negative impacts on competition.  
Private parties who occasionally are cloaked in a modicum of state authority, 
however, are not sovereign, so deference to their anticompetitive policies does 
not vindicate the federalism principles that animate the state action doctrine.188  
Second, boards composed of private market participants pose greater 
competitive dangers than elected representatives, and hence deserve more 
invasive antitrust oversight.  Because of the risk that private parties will pursue 
their own interests, states cannot merely authorize them to violate the antitrust 
laws to pursue state policies – they must supervise their conduct to assure 
consonance with state policy.  There simply is no principled difference 
between wholly private actors and those clothed in state authority, via their 
title (e.g., “real estate commissioner,” or member of the “board of dentistry” or 
“board of optometry”), for a few days each year.  If public choice theory has 
taught us anything, it is that those who work in government do not check their 
private incentives at the entrance to their building.  This lesson is all the more 
relevant in situations involving those who are charged with governing in 
tandem with their private enterprise.  As then-Judge Breyer noted in FTC v. 
Monahan,189 the Massachusetts Pharmacy Board may be engaged in activities 
that “are ‘essentially’ those of private parties,” and that the relevant state action 
inquiry was “how the Board functions in practice, and perhaps upon the role 
played by its members who are private pharmacists.”190  In this manner, 
antitrust review of the reasonableness of anticompetitive policies enacted 
would merely take the place of state review that is lacking.  Third, as Professor 
Wiley has pointed out, Lochner-era decisions left no escape valve because they 
were grounded in the Constitution.191  If Congress were displeased with courts’ 
review of reasonableness for state boards comprised of private actions, 
however, it could always revoke this power by amending the antitrust laws.   
Another check on judicial meddling is found in Midcal: private parties can 
engage in conduct that otherwise would violate the antitrust laws if they are 
acting pursuant to a clear government policy and are actively supervised by the 
 
188 The Court has been clear about this distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign 
actions in its jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984) (stating 
that action taken by “a nonsovereign state representative” requires “a showing that the 
conduct is pursuant to a ‘clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy’ to 
replace competition with regulation”); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975) 
(“The threshold inquiry into determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action of the 
type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the activity is required by the 
State acting as sovereign.”). 
189 832 F.2d 688 (1st Cir. 1987).  
190 Id. at 690.  
191 See Wiley, supra note 136, at 779. 
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state.  Thus, anticompetitive regulations promulgated by self-interested boards 
still can be saved if it can be shown that they are acting for the state rather than 
on their own account.  Requiring a state board’s anticompetitive regulations to 
be actively supervised may reduce a state’s flexibility in implementing its 
policies,192 but this is the price the state must pay when it desires to thwart the 
national policy in favor of competition.  There need to be assurances that the 
state, rather than a collection of private self-interested actors working under the 
color of state authority, has made the choice to restrain competition. 
Congress could amend the definition of private party for the antitrust laws, 
but given the reaction in the wake of Hallie, this would be politically 
unlikely.193  The better course would probably be for the Court to effect this 
change since it has never ruled on the issue.194  To assuage concerns that 
subjecting state regulators to the potential of treble damages may deter 
efficient administration of state law, another possible congressional fix would 
be to allow only the FTC,  under the FTC Act, to bring actions against state 
boards.  This approach would ensure that at most, states would be subject only 
to equitable remedies (e.g., enjoining anticompetitive regulation and perhaps 
fencing-in relief) and, moreover, there that there could be no follow-on private 
litigation that may pose the threat of treble monetary damages.195  It is also 
similar to the congressional reaction to Hallie, which was to allow only 
injunctive relief in antitrust suits against municipalities.196 
Interstate spillovers.  The federalism-based justification for the Court’s 
current state action construction rests on a theory of political accountability.  
When the sovereign restricts competition as part of a broader regulatory 
scheme – either directly or indirectly through supervised private parties – it is 
acting (at least in theory) on behalf of a population that has chosen through the 
democratic process to forego the benefits of competition to achieve another 
goal.  When a state exports the costs attendant to its anticompetitive regulatory 
scheme to those who have not participated in the political process, however, 
there is no political backstop; arguments for immunity based on federalism 
concerns are severely weakened, if not wholly eviscerated, in these situations.  
Leaving aside disenfranchisement concerns, it is well-known that the ability to 
externalize costs leads to overconsumption; when citizens can export the costs 
 
192 See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 646-47 (1992) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
193 See Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (2006). 
194 In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, the Court stated in dicta that “[i]n cases in 
which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that active supervision would also not be 
required, although we do not here decide that issue.”  471 U.S. 34, 46 n.10 (1985).    
195 Although equitable remedies may not provide adequate deterrence, at least 
injunctions provide a vehicle for stopping ongoing anticompetitive conduct, which will 
inure to consumers.  Further, the cost of defending a federal antitrust suit is likely to provide 
additional deterrence.  
196 See 15 U.S.C. § 35. 
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of a program – higher prices – and capture the full benefits – rents to a favored 
group, it will set inefficiently high levels of regulation.197 
It is hard to envision a transaction that does not in some way export costs to 
neighboring states – allowed to run rampant, an interstate spillover exception 
ultimately could swallow the whole state action doctrine.  Accordingly, this 
exception should be limited to instances where the spillovers are large – both 
in terms of the magnitude of the overcharge and the proportion of the 
overcharge that is exported to other states.  First, with respect to the latter 
condition, courts should focus on instances where more than half of the 
industry output is sent into interstate commerce.  Second, it is also important to 
realize that even if a state exports most of the output from the industry subject 
to the anticompetitive regulatory scheme, when the regulated industry faces 
substantial interstate competition, it will be unable to force extraterritorial 
customers to pay the overcharge.198  Professors Rubinfeld and Inman, for 
example, suggest following the U.S. Department of Justice’s and the Federal 
Trade Commission’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines to limit an interstate 
spillover exception to those instances in which an industry could profitably 
raise prices to non-residents by at least five percent.199  A more tractable 
approach that would economize on judicial resources and limit battles of 
economic experts may be to use a threshold national or regional market share 
of roughly seventy percent as a screen before delving into more complex 
analysis.200   
An additional cabin to a spillover exception would again be that the 
underlying conduct mandated or promoted by the law would otherwise violate 
the antitrust laws.  Although health and safety regulations or taxes that more or 
less affect all market participants equally but that export costs could be 
challenged under the Dormant Commerce Clause, they could not be challenged 
under a Supremacy Clause theory that they conflict with the antitrust laws.  
These limitations also would help to assure that a spillover exception to state 
action immunity does not eviscerate Dormant Commerce Clause 
 
197 See Frank Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 
23, 38-39 (1983); Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 146, at 1238-39.   
198 Of course, this observation suggests that industries that export most of their product 
into competitive national markets would have little incentive to seek this kind of regulation. 
199 See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 146, at 1277-80.  
200 Courts generally support a finding of monopoly power with shares at or above the 
seventy percent range.  See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 
U.S. 451, 484 (1992); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
A seventy percent threshold screen strikes a good balance between costs associated with 
wasted judicial resources and erroneously allowing a suit to preempt an anticompetitive 
state law to go forward when interstate effects are negligible, on the one hand, and the 
possibility of erroneously allowing a law with appreciable interstate effects to stand, on the 
other.  
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jurisprudence.201  In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,202 the Supreme Court held a 
non-discriminatory local regulation that indirectly affects interstate commerce 
is constitutional as long as it is directed at a legitimate local interest, and it 
does not place an unduly large burden on interstate commerce in relation to its 
purported local benefits.203  Steering away from laws that are not otherwise 
subject to preemption would limit the extent to which a spillover exception to 
the state action doctrine could become a back-door way to challenge local 
regulation that otherwise would be constitutionally firm under a Pike balancing 
test.   
At the same time, we believe that Supremacy Clause analysis should take 
precedent over Dormant Commerce Clause analysis when spillover effects are 
sufficiently large.204  There is a danger of conflict between a spillover 
exception to the state action doctrine and Pike when a state law allows 
supervised per se illegal behavior in an industry that exports a large majority of 
its output.  The Court has been clear that promoting supracompetitive prices is 
a legitimate state interest in Pike balancing.205  The Court also explicitly 
blessed Parker, a case in which a cartel exported ninety-five percent of its 
product to other states or countries.206  Thus, there may be cases in which 
Dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause challenges would reach 
different conclusions because, for example, exported overcharges were small 
in relation to the purported local benefits.   
These inconsistent outcomes should not be troubling, because Dormant 
Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause actions have different rationales.  
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis concerns states’ powers to affect 
interstate commerce in an area where Congress has not exercised its commerce 
 
201 That is, there needs to be a set of conduct that impermissibly burdens interstate 
commerce, but otherwise is not subject to preemption, on the one hand, and a set of conduct 
that is subject to preemption, but does not burden interstate commerce, on the other. 
202 397 U.S. 137 (1970).  
203 See id. at 142 (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate 
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.”); see also Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor 
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) (“[When a local law] has only indirect effects on interstate 
commerce and regulates even-handedly, we have examined whether the State’s interest is 
legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local 
benefits.”). 
204 See Easterbrook, supra note 197, at 45-46 (arguing that federal antitrust laws should 
apply to state regulation only in the case of substantial interstate spillovers).  But see 
Elhauge, supra note 137, at 732 (commenting that the courts may have trouble determining 
whether a law disproportionately burdens outsiders and contending that in-state consumers 
who have a political voice are good proxies for those affected out of state).  
205 Pike, 397 U.S. at 143 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)). 
206 Parker, 317 U.S. at 345. 
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power.207  Antitrust preemption, on the other hand, concerns a state’s power to 
act inconsistently with a policy that Congress expressed to the fullest extent of 
its commerce power.208  That is, when Congress has spoken, Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis is irrelevant; the task becomes one of 
accommodating inconsistent state and federal policies.  When the costs of 
anticompetitive state action fall on those who have no say in the decision, the 
core rationale underlying the state action doctrine – federalism – is not present, 
and hence there is no reason to interpret antitrust laws so as not to cover the 
suspect regulation.  
Although it would need to finesse Parker, the Court probably could effect 
this approach without serious stare decisis concerns.  In Parker, the Court 
rejected commerce clause arguments in large part because the economic 
support of farmers was a matter of state and national concern during the 
Depression.209  Indeed, the Parker Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis relied heavily on the panoply of federal policies that existed to support 
agricultural prices.210  Parker, therefore, must be seen in its historical context – 
the antitrust laws existed side-by-side with a federal policy to stabilize 
agricultural prices in an attempt to stem the severe economic downturn.  As the 
Court explained, the proration scheme was a local regulation “whose effect 
upon national commerce is such as not to conflict but to coincide with a policy 
which Congress has established with respect to it.”211  Viewed through this 
lens, Parker did not really present a state-federal conflict;212 rather, the conflict 
was between the federal policy in favor of competition and the federal and 
state polices that saw robust competition as the root of depressed agricultural 
prices.  Because competition concerns often lost out to New Deal programs at 
the federal level, it is safe to assume that California’s scheme in Parker would 
be inoculated against antitrust challenge under our proposed spillover test.  
Although citizens in raisin-importing states did not acquiesce in California’s 
raisin proration regulation, they had indirectly agreed to suspend competition 
 
207 See id. at 362 (explaining that a Dormant Commerce Clause inquiry reconciles state 
regulation of local matters that affect interstate commerce “[w]hen Congress has not exerted 
its power under the Commerce Clause”).  
208 See United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945) (“Congress, 
in passing the Sherman Act, . . . ‘exercised all the power it possessed.’” (quoting Apex 
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940))). 
209 See Parker, 317 U.S. at 367. 
210 What’s more, the California program at issue in Parker had at least some connection 
to a federal price support program.  See id. at 366 (discussing that Raisin Proration Zone No. 
1 received loans from the Commodity Credit Corporation that were conditioned on the 
creation of a proration zone and that its surplus crops were sold to the Federal Surplus 
Commodities Corporation). 
211 Id. at 363.  
212 See id. (“There may also be, as in the present case, local regulations whose effect 
upon the national commerce is such as not to conflict but to coincide with a policy which 
Congress has established with respect to it.”). 
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norms in agricultural markets through their political participation at the federal 
level.  Had the price support program in Parker taken place beyond the 
umbrella of a consonant federal policy to support agricultural prices, it is not at 
all clear that the outcome would have remained the same.   
2. Noerr-Pennington 
Like the state action doctrine, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has evolved as 
the Court attempted to avoid a conflict between the antitrust laws and the 
Constitution.  Noerr has developed as a doctrine of statutory interpretation in 
the face of First Amendment concerns.  This evolutionary path has created an 
interstice between the reach of the antitrust laws and the First Amendment, 
which means that the Court (or Congress) has room to make Pareto 
improvements to the doctrine; that is, there is room to clarify Noerr in a way 
that permits antitrust scrutiny of previously immune anticompetitive conduct 
without diminishing incentives to engage in First Amendment protected speech 
or reducing the scope and effectiveness of governmental decision making.  
Below we identify two areas that are especially ripe for such clarification.   
Broadening the scope of the sham exception for a pattern of filings.  Noerr 
does not protect attempts to use the governmental process, as opposed to the 
outcome of that process, to hinder competition.  Thus, a company that sues a 
competitor in the hopes of enjoining it from using copyrighted software enjoys 
immunity.  On the other hand, a firm that initiates a zoning proceeding without 
any interest in the ultimate outcome and solely to delay a competitor’s market 
entry and to force it to it to pay a higher interest rate for bonds213 does not 
enjoy Noerr protection.  This dichotomy makes sense because the former 
scenario implicates a legitimate attempt to secure governmental action, which 
is constitutionally protected, whereas the latter scenario does not involve the 
exercise of a First Amendment right. 
In reality, however, distinguishing legitimate attempts to secure government 
action from “sham” petitioning, which is designed to use process as an 
anticompetitive weapon, can be a difficult task because it ultimately involves 
an inquiry into the intent behind a decision to initiate a government 
proceeding.  PREI, the Court’s most recent pronouncement on the topic, held 
that the inquiry – to determine whether a suit was a legitimate attempt to 
procure government action or merely an attempt to impose process-based costs 
on a rival – is two-fold: the threshold question is whether a filing is objectively 
baseless; only if this condition is met may the fact finder inquire into 
subjective motivation for bringing the suit.214  The PREI standard for objective 
 
213 See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1973). 
214 See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. (PREI), 508 
U.S. 49, 50, 57 (1993) (“[A]n objectively reasonable effort to litigate cannot be a sham 
regardless of subjective intent.”).  
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baselessness, moreover, is a stringent one – it is only met upon a showing that 
no reasonable litigant could possibly expect success on the merits.215 
The Court thus requires an antitrust plaintiff to satisfy an objective screen 
before it will entertain a full-fledged inquiry into the subjective intent behind 
petitioning.  This is consistent with antitrust jurisprudence that shows concern 
for over-deterring procompetitive conduct when information is imperfect.216  
Although one may infer intent from the available evidence, it can never be 
directly ascertained.  Intent resides only in the defendant’s mind, and, in the 
face of an antitrust suit, the defendant will always claim that its intent behind 
filing was to obtain relief, not to impose direct costs.  Thus, any inquiry into 
intent is necessarily subjective and thus prone to error because it is not subject 
to external verification.  An objective measurement, on the other hand, is based 
on observable phenomena that look the same to all observers and that are 
therefore untainted by personal opinion.217 
For a single filing, the objectively baseless threshold is understandably high.  
Courts have very little information, and the stakes are significant.  The threat 
of treble damages that hinge on an overarching inquiry into subjective intent 
will likely chill legitimate petitioning activity.218  Thus, PREI probably strikes 
the right balance between competition values and the First Amendment in the 
context of a single – or very few – filings.  When courts are faced with a host 
of filings directed at the same competitor, however, a less stringent inquiry into 
objective baselessness than the one the Court used in PREI makes sense.  
Ceteris paribus, larger data sets mean more precise parameter estimates.219  In 
the context of petitioning, courts use the available evidence to estimate an 
answer to the threshold question – was the defendant using the process to harm 
a competitor rather than to obtain governmental action?  With more 
information, and hence more accurate estimates of underlying purpose, courts 
can be both more confident in the inferences they take from the evidence and 
less worried about falsely condemning true petitioning.  For example, a data 
set of fifty identical zoning challenges filed to delay a rival’s entry provides a 
far more accurate estimate of underlying intent than one lawsuit filed to enjoin 
a competitor from using allegedly copyrighted material.   
 
215 See id. at 62-63. 
216 See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1120 (2009); 
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 
(1993).  
217 The difference between objective and subjective inquiries is the difference between 
scoring figure skating and football: determining the winner in the former contest is often a 
matter of contention because it requires subjective assessments; determining the winner in 
the latter merely requires looking at the scoreboard. 
218 See PREI, 508 U.S. at 69-70 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
219 An estimated parameter’s standard error defines the level of confidence one has in its 
accuracy.  Standard errors decrease as sample sizes increase.   
 1604 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1555 
 
Thus, in the repetitive petitioning scenario, we suggest that courts should 
still adhere to an objective threshold before engaging in a full-fledged intent 
inquiry, but that they adopt a less-stringent objective baselessness test than the 
one in PREI.  We think that given the accuracy that goes along with enhanced 
data, the risk of deterring protected speech is minimal – thus, this rule would 
address “breathing space” concerns.  Further, because this test addresses harm 
coming from abuse of the process rather than the outcome, it in no way 
infringes upon states’ rights to engage in economic regulation. 
A defendant’s win rate is one possible candidate for a less stringent 
objective screen.  The only two federal courts of appeal to have addressed 
squarely how pattern cases like California Motor Transport should be 
analyzed after PREI have adopted this standard.  In USS-POSCO Industries v. 
Contra Costa County Building & Construction Trades Council,220 the Ninth 
Circuit stated that PREI’s evaluation of a single suit is “essentially 
retrospective: If the suit turns out to have objective merit, the plaintiff can’t 
proceed to inquire into subjective purposes, and the action is perforce not a 
sham.”221  Because the Supreme Court recognized in California Motor 
Transport that a series of suits can inflict much more harm on a competitor 
than a single suit, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that  
When dealing with a series of lawsuits, the question is not whether any 
one of them has merit – some may turn out to, just as a matter of chance – 
but whether they are brought pursuant to a policy of starting legal 
proceedings without regard to the merits and for the purpose of injuring a 
market rival.222  
The court used the success rate to infer whether the litigation was filed without 
regard to the merit, but because the defendants had succeeded in over half of 
its suits, the court concluded that plaintiffs could not overcome defendants’ 
Noerr defense.223  The Second Circuit subsequently adopted similar reasoning 
 
220 31 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J.). 
221 Id. at 811.   
222 Id. 
223 See id. (that more than half of the actions turned out to have merit “cannot be 
reconciled with the charge that the unions were filing lawsuits and other actions willy-nilly 
without regard to success”); see also Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1519 (9th Cir. 
1996) (approving of the USS-POSCO test but finding it inapplicable to the two lawsuits 
alleged).  At least one district court has employed the USS-POSCO/Primetime 24 test to 
strip a defendant of Noerr protection for a pattern of litigation.  See Livingston Downs 
Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Jefferson Downs Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 519, 538 (M.D. La. 2001).  
Some district courts appear to have adopted the USS-POSCO/Primetime 24 test for 
repetitive petitioning but have found insufficient allegations or facts to deny the defendants 
Noerr protection.  See, e.g., Twin City Bakery Workers & Welfare Fund v. Astra 
Aktiebolag, 207 F. Supp. 2d 221, 224 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Gen-Probe, Inc. v Amoco Corp., 
926 F. Supp. 948, 959 (S.D. Cal. 1996). 
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in Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. National Broadcasting Co.,224 which involved 
allegations that the defendants coordinated a series of signal-strength 
challenges under the Satellite Home Viewer Act, without regard to the merits 
of each, for the purpose of injuring a market rival.225  Applying this standard, 
the court concluded that defendants were not entitled to Noerr protection 
because Primetime 24 alleged a sufficiently low win-rate to suggest that the 
signal-strength challenges were “‘brought pursuant to a policy of starting legal 
proceedings without regard to the merits and for the purpose of injuring a 
market rival.’”226 
Another possible approach is to look at the financial viability of suits.  Some 
suits may be reasonable in the sense that the probability of winning is 
sufficiently greater than zero but may appear unreasonable when probabilities 
are weighted by outcome values and costs are taken into account.227  For 
example, a reasonable inference to be taken from filing a suit with an expected 
value of $1000, but that costs $10,000 to prosecute, may be that the suit has an 
additional value of at least $9001 flowing from the direct effects on rivals.  
Although the majority in PREI explicitly rejected an expected value test as an 
objective screen in the context of a single suit,228 it may remain a viable 
approach when applied to multiple filings.  Further, despite PREI’s seeming 
equation of economic viability with subjective motivation,229 this screen 
clearly lends itself to objective measurement.  Indeed, the PREI concurrence 
suggested the expected value test as a method to evaluate shams in a series of 
filings: “The label ‘sham’ . . . might also apply to a plaintiff who had some 
reason to expect success on the merits but because of its tremendous cost 
would not bother to achieve that result without the benefit of collateral injuries 
imposed on its competitor by the legal process alone.”230   
Clarify that intentional misrepresentations do not qualify for immunity.  The 
extent to which parties who use fraud or deceit to procure favorable 
governmental action enjoy Noerr protection remains unclear.  The Supreme 
Court has addressed the issue of fraud on the patent office as a stand-alone 
 
224 219 F.3d 92, 101 (2d Cir. 2000). 
225 Id. 
226 Id. (quoting USS-POSCO, 31 F.3d at 811). 
227 Judge Posner articulated this approach in Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 
694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982): “Many claims not wholly groundless would never be 
sued on for their own sake; the stakes, discounted by the probability of winning, would be 
too low to repay the investment in litigation.” 
228 Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. (PREI), 508 U.S. 
49, 65-66 (1993). 
229 Id. at 61 (explaining that plaintiff must disprove legal viability before it will entertain 
evidence of economic viability); id. at 65-66 (inquiring whether the expected award could 
justify Columbia’s investment in litigation “concern[ing] Columbia’s economic motivations 
in bringing the suit, which were rendered irrelevant by the objective legal reasonableness of 
the litigation”).  
230 Id. at 68-69 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
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antitrust offense,231 and has twice hinted at the existence of a misrepresentation 
exception to Noerr.232  However, the Court expressly declined to address 
whether a general misrepresentation exception to Noerr exists,233 and to date, 
the “sham” exception is the only exception to Noerr that the Supreme Court 
has recognized.  Under various theories, however, several lower courts have 
refused to provide Noerr protection to misrepresentations.234  One theme that 
emerges from this jurisprudence is that misrepresentations are condoned in the 
political arena, but enjoy no immunity in more formal arenas, where fact 
finders must assume the veracity of the parties before them.235 
Despite some lower court rulings,236 because parties who lie to procure 
favorable regulation are genuinely seeking government action, it appears 
difficult to squeeze misrepresentations into the sham exception.237  A separate 
exception is needed – one that is not grounded in notions of genuineness, but, 
rather, that focuses on the extent to which falsehoods designed to procure 
government action really advance any of Noerr’s underpinnings.  
On its own, false speech does not advance any First Amendment interests.  
Thus, there is no reason to protect fraud calculated to procure anticompetitive 
government action.  Nevertheless, in an effort to provide “breathing space” for 
legitimate speech, the Supreme Court has crafted rules that offer some 
protection for false speech.238  Consistent with the notion of crafting rules that 
are unlikely to deter legitimate speech, the Court has held that baseless suits 
should enjoy protection similar to that which false speech enjoys.239  
Accordingly, only a baseless suit that is also subjectively motivated by an 
unlawful purpose falls outside of Noerr’s protection.240  By limiting a 
misrepresentation exception to Noerr to intentional falsehoods that are 
calculated to obtain the government action at issue, courts take into account 
deterrence concerns, leaving ample breathing space for legitimate petitions.241  
 
231 See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 
(1965).  
232 See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 503 (1987); Cal. 
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).  
233 See PREI, 508 U.S. at 61-62 n.6 (“We need not decide here whether and, if so, to 
what extent Noerr permits the imposition of antitrust liability for a litigant’s fraud or other 
misrepresentations.”).  
234 See NOERR-PENNINGTON REPORT, supra note 120, at 25-26 (citing cases from the 
Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, Federal, and District of Columbia 
circuits that support a misrepresentation exception to the Noerr doctrine).  
235 Id. at 26-27.  
236 See, e.g., Kottle v. Nw. Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 1998).  
237 See, e.g., 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 173, at ¶ 203a. 
238 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (quoting NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).  
239 BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002).  
240 See id.  
241 See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of Cal., 140 F.T.C. 123, 150 (2005). 
 2010] U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NORMS 1607 
 
It is also important to point out that a misrepresentation designed to procure 
anticompetitive government regulation is likely to cause harm orders of 
magnitude larger than harm caused by the abuse of process; although the latter 
can inflict competitive harm by imposing costs on a rival, the former conduct, 
if successful, will result in government enforcement of an anticompetitive 
scheme that will linger unless invalidated by a court or repealed by future 
regulators, both unlikely outcomes.  Because the stakes are higher in the 
context of misrepresentations, therefore, the breathing space concerns should 
be minimal.   
Additionally, an exception for intentional misrepresentations does not 
offend notions of federalism or limit government’s ability to obtain the 
information necessary to govern.  First, intentional falsehoods usurp the 
governmental process; the resultant anticompetitive regulation does not 
represent the will of the people, but, rather, a hijacking of the regulatory 
structure.  Second, we do not want government to make decisions based on 
false information, so a rule that deters misrepresentations is likely to enhance 
the accuracy of information provided to the government.  
There is no principled reason to afford false speech in the political arena any 
more protection than false speech made in other, more formal arenas, such as 
regulatory or adjudicatory proceedings: falsehoods, regardless of their context, 
advance no First Amendment interests, and there is no reason to think that 
anticompetitive legislation obtained by fraud is any less likely to cause 
competitive harm than fraudulently procured regulation or adjudication.  
Nonetheless, as a practical matter, evidentiary concerns militate toward 
limiting any such exception to more formal proceedings, such as adjudication 
and rulemaking.  The same reasons that counsel against allowing state action 
immunity to turn on the motives underlying regulatory decisions, suggest that 
it would be nearly impossible for an antitrust plaintiff to establish causation in 
cases involving a decision-maker who enjoys broad discretion and does not 
rely on the veracity of input to craft an output.   
B. Containment: Ex Ante Review of Proposed Measures 
The previous Section discussed relaxing current interpretations of 
immunities that hinder ex post challenges to anticompetitive state actions or 
anticompetitive uses of the regulatory process.  This Section explores the 
possibility of ex ante intervention to prevent anticompetitive harm before it 
occurs.  An alternative to the ex post antitrust challenge to anticompetitive 
state regulation is to allow the U.S. competition authority to have ex ante input 
into policy-making.  This power could range from informal input to veto 
power.  Correcting problems ahead of time is likely to be more efficient than 
ex post remediation via the antitrust laws.242  As discussed in Part III, 
competition authority input is commonplace in other jurisdictions. 
 
242 See James C. Cooper, Paul A. Pautler & Todd J. Zywicki, Theory and Practice of 
Competition Advocacy at the FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091, 1110-11 (2005).  
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At the state level, ex ante prevention is a political and practical non-starter.  
It is hard to envision politicians from any party acquiescing to a rule that 
requires federal competition authority input into purely state matters.  Further, 
because states promulgate literally thousands of regulations that may affect 
competition every year, the FTC and DOJ could not possibly perform even a 
cursory review of state laws at current staff levels.  Indeed, current FTC and 
DOJ staff barely manage thirty advocacies annually.243  To review all relevant 
state proposals would require dramatically increasing FTC and DOJ staff or 
shifting most resources from enforcement to regulatory review.  Finally, it is 
not at all clear that a federal mandate requiring this type of review would 
survive a challenge as an unconstitutional expansion of Congress’s commerce 
power.244  A regime set up by federal mandate, moreover, would be 
inconsistent with the Court’s reluctance to second-guess the competitive 
effects of state regulation under the antitrust laws.  Required ex ante review by 
federal executive branch or independent agency staff to assess the competitive 
effects of state regulation seems little different. 
An alternative to federal review would be to have review performed by state 
attorney general staff expert in competition law.245  This arrangement would 
alleviate federalism concerns, and it is likely to reduce informational costs 
because a state attorney general is in a much better position than federal 
authorities to handle anticompetitive regulation and to alleviate state-level staff 
 
243 Advocacy Filings by Date, FED. TRADE COMM’N, OFFICE OF POL’Y PLANNING, 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/advocacy_date.shtm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) (listing thirteen 
advocacy filings for the FTC and DOJ in 2009). 
244 Despite the Court’s modern, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 
Congress’s power is still subject to outer limits and  
must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be 
extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that 
to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the 
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely 
centralized government.   
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937); see also United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610, 618 (2000) (stating that although “‘[w]here economic activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be 
sustained,’” regulation “of intrastate [matters] that [are] not directed at the instrumentalities, 
channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of the 
States” (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995))); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
565-68 (explaining that the Court “[does] not doubt that Congress has authority under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate numerous commercial activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce,” yet “[t]hat authority, though broad, does not include the authority to 
regulate each and every aspect of local [matters]”; moreover, “[t]o do so would require us to 
conclude that the Constitution’s enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not 
enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and 
what is truly local.  This [the Court is] unwilling to do”). 
245 This review would be different from review to determine antitrust compliance, which 
already occurs in many states.  
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concerns.  If this regime arose from a federal mandate, however, federalism 
and political concerns would still exist.  Further, not all states’ attorneys 
general have sufficient staff expertise in competition law to perform adequate 
review.  Thus, as in the case of federal review, state review would require 
major increases in staff or a reallocation of funding from their enforcement 
mission.  
Ex ante competition authority review is likely to be a feasible option only at 
the federal level, and because federal competition agencies cannot bring suit 
against sister federal agencies or the legislative branch to stop anticompetitive 
policies, ex ante review is likely to be the only effective tool to address 
potentially anticompetitive policies.  There is precedent for this approach.  
Some laws require FTC and DOJ review of federal agency actions.246  Further, 
the FTC and DOJ are often required to consult with agencies developing rules 
that implicate competition,247 and currently engage in informal dialogue with 
sister agencies and congressional staff on the competition effects of various 
proposals.  The FTC and DOJ, moreover, engage in formal advocacy with 
federal agencies through the notice-and-comment portion of rule-making 
procedure.248   
Although it is clear that U.S. competition authorities have enjoyed input into 
federal policy-making for some time, formal review requirements would 
strengthen the agencies’ ability to force federal policy makers to take 
competition values into account.  At one end of the spectrum, Congress could 
require legislative committees or federal agencies to consider the agencies’ 
competitive analysis when passing a law.249  Thus, the FTC and DOJ would 
not exercise a veto power, but could instead force a public explanation of why 
some values trump competition values.  Congress also could give the FTC and 
DOJ a veto power over some agency decisions.  That is, policy makers would 
have to address competition concerns to the agencies’ satisfaction before a 
 
246 For example, the Department of Interior must seek antitrust review of its outer 
continental shelf oil exploration leasing decisions.  See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(c)(3) (2010).  
Likewise, the Department of Energy must consult with the antitrust agencies on potential 
competitive impacts when promulgating a rule that authorizes or requires a commercial 
standard.  See 15 U.S.C. § 788(c) (2010).     
247 See, e.g., Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 109-435, § 703(a), 
120 Stat. 3198 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 39 U.S.C.).  
248 See generally Letter from Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Dep’t 
of Transp. (June 6, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/06/dotcomment.htm; 
Letter from Donald S. Clark, Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Jean A. Webb, Sec’y to the 
Comm’n, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (Jan. 12, 2004), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/01/040113cftccommenttext.pdf; Comment from the Staff of the 
Bureau of Econ. et. al, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Food & Drug Admin. & Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs. (Oct. 9, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/ 
fdafattyacidscomment.pdf. 
249 This could be similar to Congressional Budget Office scoring for budgetary 
implications.  
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policy could be implemented.  The political feasibility of this approach at the 
legislative level is slight, however, as it is highly unlikely that Congress would 
agree to circumscribe itself.  Another doubtful, if slightly more likely, scenario 
would require the agencies that promulgate regulations to obtain FTC and DOJ 
approval prior to final enactment.   
C. Ex Post Assessment: A Research Program to Evaluate Effects 
Competition agencies could devote greater resources to conduct research to 
measure the effects of public policies that restrict competition.  A research 
program could accumulate and analyze empirical data that assesses the 
consumer welfare effects of specific restrictions.  Such a program could also 
assess whether the stated public interest objectives of government restrictions 
are realized in practice.  By making the competitive costs of public 
intervention more evident, such a program would inform public debate about 
the continuation of existing restrictions and the future adoption of similar 
measures.  This form of analysis would be especially valuable if the 
government restrictions were made subject to a sunset provision that forced 
periodic reconsideration of the measures in question. 
D. Adjustments in Federal/State Collaboration 
Existing U.S. jurisprudence governing the antitrust significance of state 
action accords considerable discretion to state legislatures to enact measures 
that restrict competition.  In practice, this means that the front line of debate 
and policy-making take place within the state legislative process.  One can 
imagine that antitrust units of the state attorneys general might expand their 
efforts to track legislative developments and to advocate against measures that 
curb competition.250  This expansion could be part of a federal/state partnership 
in which federal antitrust agencies formally join their state counterparts in 
preparing advocacies on these measures or providing assistance – in the form 
of research and analysis – to states that making appearances in their own name. 
CONCLUSION 
Discussions about the appropriate content of competition policy among the 
many jurisdictions with antitrust laws reflect a consensus that public restraints 
upon rivalry deserve as much attention as private behavior.  The U.S. antitrust 
system, however, lags behind a number of other jurisdictions in its capacity to 
deal effectively with government measures that restrict competition.  A 
valuable frontier for future U.S. work to achieve convergence in competition 
policy is to pursue policies that align the United States more closely with its 
global counterparts in their treatment of public intervention.  
 
250 The possibilities for doing so are discussed in William E. Kovacic, Toward a 
Domestic Competition Network, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT 316, 326 (Richard A. 
Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004). 
